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Abstract 
Nowadays near field communication are largely used in so many different applications 
for the convenience and ease of use they provide. They store and exchange many 
personal data, some of them requires more security than others, due to the value they 
poses, such as banking information and personal identification. And maintaining high 
level of security is task of the utmost priority. 
The main focus of this thesis is establishing a knowledge base for different NFC/RFID 
devices. Evaluating the different encryption algorithms used currently, based on their 
encryption/decryption time, their immunity to brute force attack, and the amount of 
power needed to execute them. 
The encryption algorithms will be implemented using Python programing language and 
tested on a windows computer in order to test their immunity against brute force attack. 
Encryption/decryption time and the power usage will be tested on a Raspberry Pi, for 
the similarities it has with modern mobile devices. 
 
Keywords: Encryption, Decryption, Brute Force Attack, NFC, Security.  
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1. Introduction 
Ever since Marconi proved the radio waves capability to provide a continuous contact in 
1897, the wireless telecommunication revolution started (Hioki 2000). The speed at 
which it grows has never been faster. Nowadays telecommunication has different 
applications such as broadcasting to several receivers (TV and Radio), point to point 
systems (control unit to machine), a point to multi point systems (cellular systems), 
wireless networks and many others varying from long to short distance. The main focus 
of this thesis is on Near Field Communication (NFC), a form of a short range 
communication, analyzing the security techniques used. 
NFC technology was developed by Sony and Philips - based on radio frequency 
identification technology (RFID) - in order to share information at a maximum data rate 
of 424kbps by providing a wireless communication link between devices separated by 
less than 4 centimeters. NFC technology is compliant with RFID standards and 
protocols. 
 
 
Figure 1. Distance and data rate difference of NFC with other existing wireless technologies (NFC Forum) 
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The communication between the two devices requires at least one of them to be active. 
Due to the simplicity of establishing a connection, this technology has potentials in 
various applications such as ticketing, e-commerce, electronics keys and identifications, 
and also complimenting many other wireless technologies such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. 
NFC is compatible with other existing contactless infrastructure and it enables users to 
use one device with different systems (NFC Specifications). NFC is based on RFID 
technology, the main characteristic that differentiates NFC from RFID is that the new 
technology prepares bidirectional data transmission between NFC equipped devices. For 
the communication between the two devices it is just enough to bring them close 
together or make them touch physically (Hossein 2012). 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze and examine the different security 
techniques used, to ensure the integrity and safety of the shared information between 
RFID enabled devices. The main focus is on encryptions algorithms. 
To achieve this goal, a base of knowledge regarding NFC systems must be established. 
Therefore, at first, there will be an introduction to the RFID systems, followed by a 
technical overview for NFC systems and different operation modes. 
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2. Literature Review 
NFC topic is still relatively new in the literature sense, and the idea in its basic form 
developed from the older RFID communication systems. The advancement in mobile 
computational power has facilitated the emergence of new application.  Due to this 
reason, most of the literature deals with application development and how it utilizes 
NFC systems in different areas.  Literature regarding NFC security is somewhat sparse 
and about one fifth of all the literature regarding NFC is related to security.  This is 
mainly due to the nature of NFC systems, the close proximity provides a natural 
immunity against several attacks, and partially due to the fact that NFC systems is still 
new and not widely used in different areas communication and commerce. 
Naser Hossein Motlagh details the NFC systems and the background from which it was 
derived in his Master level thesis from the University of Vaasa. NFC stands for Near 
Field Communication, and in definition it refers to short range wireless communication 
technique operating on 13.6 MHz with 14 KHz bandwidth.  Initially developed by Sony 
and Philips and derived from RFID protocols, NFC devices are backward compatible 
with other RFID enabled devices. The main advantage of NFC systems is the fast 
detection and setup time. Hence it can be used to facilitate other forms of 
communication such as Bluetooth or WLAN connection without any manual 
configurations, by just simply bringing the two devices in close proximity to each other 
and the connection is set. Other applications include Peer-to-Peer mode to transfer data 
over the NFC connection, Reader/Writer mode in which an NFC enabled device can 
manipulate the content stored in passive RFID tags or smart cards, and Card Emulator 
mode, that allows the NFC enabled device to “mimic” a smart card so it could be read 
by an external smart card reader (i.e. debt card reader). (Hossein 2012) 
The paper “NFC Devices: Security and Privacy” by Madlmayer, Langer, Kantner and 
Scharinger examines the issue of privacy and security, after a short introduction of NFC 
systems and its component.  Several key Scenario Cases were introduced, based on 
them, threat model assumptions and suggestions were given, regardless of the actual 
feasibility of the threats.  Also, they have defined the trust levels of the NFC systems 
components and how to improve them, what are the risks related to each component 
itself, and the connection to other components.  The proposed counter measures include 
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dynamic ID with no ID based services, a manual control to switch on/off NFC, which 
includes a special mode (NFC flight mode).  Other recommendations are related to the 
secure element in the NFC systems, which include authenticating the application index 
in the Secure element, managing the in device security, and finally integrating a security 
layer for the peer to peer communication link.  The assumptions made in this paper are 
more focused on the integrity of the NFC system components, and they briefly outline 
the possible attacks that might occur during the communication between two devices.  
However, the attacks listed in this paper are generic and not intended for all wireless 
systems, since some of them are not a threat to NFC systems due to the connection 
nature of NFC systems (i.e. close proximity). (Madlmayer 2008) 
Ernst Haselsteiner and Klemens Breitfuß from Philips Semiconductors published a 
paper during Workshop on RFID Security RFIDSec (2006), under the name “Security 
in Near Field Communication (NFC) Strengths and Weaknesses”.  In their paper, they 
briefly discussed the applications and operation modes, they also discussed the most 
common threats for any wireless communication system, and how feasible they were to 
NFC systems. Based on their research results they suggested solutions to mitigate them.  
In their paper they stated that the nature of NFC was highly secure but not complete.  
Also, they showed that the man in the middle attack was practically impossible, other 
attacks like eavesdropping, and data corruption/data modification/insertion were 
possible.  These could be mitigated by using a secure channel.  Using standard key 
agreement protocols or a specific key agreement that is designed especially for NFC 
systems would provide an improved level of security.  However, their solutions require 
both ends of the communication system to be always listening which in turn results in 
more power consumption.  Also, the asymmetrical keys agreements like Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography or RSA require a higher processing power, which might not be available 
in certain low cost NFC enabled devices. (Haselsteiner & Breitfuß 2006) 
Gauthier Van Damme and Karel Wouters took a different approach with their paper 
“Practical Experiences with NFC Security on mobile Phones” by designing a Secure 
NFC Offline Payment Application, based on their analysis of different possible threats 
and attacks.  Also, they demonstrated the complexity and the byproducts of designing 
an application where the security level and privacy integrity require the highest priority.  
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In their paper, they used two Nokia phones (6131 and 6212) running on Symbian S40. 
They analyze the Secure Element available in the device, and how it affects the 
transaction characteristics.  Finally, they demonstrate the practical problems in the 
implementation. Most of the problems they encountered are related to the programming 
language used in the secure element, which increased the time of executing the 
cryptographic protocols, and limited the programmers from optimizing the application. 
(Van Damme & Wouters 2009) 
Collin Mulliner presented a method of testing and analyzing the vulnerabilities and 
possible attacks on NFC-enabled mobile phones through the application of Fuzzing 
using NFC Tags.  The NFC system itself was analyzed, along with the other 
components which can be controlled via NFC, including Telephony subsystem and the 
web browser.  During the testing several attacks were possible, and a survey was made 
among several service providers to check the feasibility and the impact of these attacks.  
The testing device was again the Nokia 6313 running the Symbian S40 operating 
system.  As discussed previously, the OS has several limitations that brings to the 
forefront vulnerabilities in the security and allows different exploits to occur. (Mulliner 
2009) 
There are several factors that affect the amount of publications regarding the security 
analysis of NFC systems. First, the lack of standardization makes testing, and 
developing solutions for security and privacy measures more complicated and less 
efficient. For example, Mulliner used the Nokia 6313 device running Symiban S40 and 
Van Damme & Wouters used the same device.  Even though both papers were 
completed in the same year, the testing methods were different, and the focus/purpose 
of the research examined different points of view within the security aspect of NFC.  
The second factor refers to the variety of operating systems, the different processing 
power and the different programming languages. This factor hinders the researchers 
from reaching a general solution for a certain application mode. (Mulliner 2009), (Van 
Damme & Wouters 2009) 
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Most publications are focused on applications within the reader/writer 
communication mode (Proximity Coupling Device, PCD), mainly reading and 
writing on passive tags. However, the main focus of this research is to examine 
the different encryption algorithms used in NFC enabled devices regardless of 
the operation mode to assess the encryption/decryption time and power 
consumption in NFC enabled devices, as well as their immunity to brute force 
attacks.
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3. Technical Overview 
3.1. RFID Overview 
RFID systems use Radio Frequencies for communication in order to identify the tagged 
objects. When a tagged object enters the read vicinity of the interrogator, the reader 
initializes the communication by sending a signal. The tag receives this signal and uses 
it as an energy source to send back the stored data. Tags can hold different types of data 
about the tagged object; these data can include the serial number, time stamps, and 
configurations and so on. 
Based on the frequency used in the RFID systems (tags and interrogator design), the 
range of communication may vary in range. Low frequencies (LF) and high frequencies 
(HF) have short identification ranges, but low cost. Ultra High Frequencies (UHF) and 
microwave frequency band are used in long ranges and high data handling rate (Balanis 
2005). 
3.1.1. RFID components 
A RFID system consists of three main components. A transponder (tag), a reader 
(interrogator) and a controller, as shown in Figure 2 
 
Figure 2. The Three Main Components of an RFID system. 
 
The reader (interrogator) is a read/write device. It contains an RF module for 
transmitting and receiving signals, attached to the RF module is the control electronic 
module and an antenna. The Tag (Transponder) is a semiconductor chip attached to an 
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antenna. Each tag contains a unique serial identification number which facilitate the 
communication with the reader. 
The RFID reader is connected to the workstation where a specific control application is 
running (e.g. computer), where software commands and database are stored. The RFID 
reader sends the data information alongside the Clock and energy (in case of passive 
tag) to be received by the tag. 
3.1.2. Classification of RFID systems 
The RFID systems are classified according to two parameters, one is energy source, and 
the other is the used frequency band. 
Passive mode of communication is when the received signal is used to energize the 
transponder. That means that the tag does not include any independent energy source. 
Active mode is when the tag circuit includes an independent energy source. These two 
types can be divided by the frequencies used for communication, as it is seen in Figure 
3. 
Figure 3. RFID System classifications (Atmel 2010: p45) 
 
Passive tags are physically smaller and less expensive than active tags, due to the lack 
of a power source. Each mode of communication has its own pros and cons, and it is up 
to the system designer to choose which tag type is more suitable. Table 1 illustrates the 
difference between active and passive mode. 
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Table 1. Active and Passive RFID tags Comparison. 
Features Passive RFID Active RFID 
Power 
Source 
External (Reader Provided) Internal (Battery) 
Tag 
Readability 
Only within the area covered by the 
reader typically up to 3 meters 
Can provide signal over an extended 
range, typically up to 100 meters 
Energy 
A passive tag is energized only when 
there is a reader present 
An active tag is always energized 
Magnetic 
Field 
Strength 
High, since the tag draws power from 
the electromagnetic field provided by 
the reader 
Low, since the tag emits signals 
using internal battery source 
Shelf Life 
Very high, in ideal case does not expire 
over the life time 
Limited to about 5 years (The life of 
a battery) 
Data 
Storage 
Limited data storage, typically 128 bytes Can store larger amount of data 
Size Small Depends on the battery size 
Cost Cheap Expensive 
 
3.1.3. RFID coupling mechanism 
Based on the application and the distance separating the reader and tag, several coupling 
types and mechanism exists, to each method its own different features. The three main 
mechanism of coupling which allows the reader and the tag to communicate are 
backscatter coupling, capacitive coupling and inductive coupling. 
RFID Backscatter coupling: The reader propagates radio signals outside the near field 
region. The tag receives the signal and uses it to energize the embedded chip and 
reflects the rest of the signal as data. This type of coupling is used for medium distance 
between the reader and the tag. Figure 4 demonstrates backscatter coupling (Cisco Wi-
Fi Location-Based Services 4.1 Design 2008:158). 
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Figure 4. Backscatter Coupling.  
 
RFID capacitive coupling: as the name implies, the coupling is done by utilizing the 
capacitive effect, this technique is most suitable for short range communication. The 
capacitance between the reader and tag provides a conducting capacitor, through which 
a signal can be transmitted, although an earth return is required. The AC signal 
generated by the reader is receive and rectified within the RFID tag and used to power 
the circuits within the tag. Again the data is returned to the RFID reader by modulating 
the load. Figure 5 is an illustration of capacitive coupling (Gorferay Card Service Co. 
Ltd) 
 
Figure 5. Capacitive Coupling. 
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RFID inductive coupling: this technique achieves coupling by utilizing mutual 
inductance between the reader and the tag circuits. Inductive coupling is also suitable 
for short range coupling. It can be used for a slightly longer range than capacitive tags. 
RFID inductive coupling requires that both the tag and the reader to have induction or 
"antenna" coils. When the tag is placed close enough to the reader, the field from the 
reader’s coil will couple to the field from the tag’s coil. A voltage will be induced in the 
tag that will be rectified and used to power the tag circuitry. Inductive Coupling is 
illustrated in Figure 6 (Glover 2006).  
 
Figure 6. Inductive Coupling. 
 
3.1.4. RFID frequency bands 
As stated earlier, the frequency bands at which the RFID system operates defines its 
range and classification. RFID systems operate in the unlicensed radio frequency bands 
known as ISM (Industrial, Scientific and Medical) but the precise frequencies which are 
defined for RFID may vary depending on the regulations in different countries. These 
frequency bands are listed in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Common RFID Operating Frequencies and Features 
Band 
LF (Low 
Frequency) 
HF (High 
Frequency) 
UHF (Ultra High 
Frequency) 
Microwave 
Frequency 30 – 300kHz 3 – 30MHz 300MHz – 3GHz 2 – 30 GHz 
Typical RFID 
Frequency 
125-134-KHz 135.6MHz 
433MHz/865-956 
MHz 
2.45Ghz 
Approximate 
Read Range 
Less than 0.5 
meter 
Up to 1.5 meter 
Up to 100 
meter/0.5-5 meter 
respectively 
Up to 10 meters 
Data Transfer 
Rate 
Less than 
1kbps 
Around 25kbps 30kbps Up to 100kbps 
Characteristic 
Short range 
low data 
transfer rate, 
penetrates 
water but not 
metals 
Higher ranges, 
reasonable data rate 
(similar to GSM 
phone), penetrates 
water but not metals 
Long range, high 
data transfer rate, 
concurrent read of 
<100 items, 
cannot penetrate 
water or metals 
Long range, high 
data transfer 
rate, cannot 
penetrate water 
or metals 
Applications 
Animal ID, car 
immobilisers 
Smart labels, 
contactless travel 
cards, access & 
security 
Specialist animal 
tracking, logistics 
Moving vehicle 
tolls 
 
LF and HF RFID systems are used for near field communication and the inductive 
coupling mechanism. UHF and higher frequencies RFID systems are used for far field 
communication with the backscattering coupling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
14 
 
3.1.5. RFID standards 
None of the applied standards in RFID systems is universal. These standards may be 
categorized into four levels of international, national, industry and association level. 
These standards cover four key areas of RFID application: 
• Air interface standards which are used for basic tag to reader communication 
• Data content and encoding i.e. the format of the codes used in tags 
• Conformance which means testing the RFID system 
• Interoperability between applications and RFID system 
 
There are several standards that define the development of RFID technologies such as: 
• International Organization of Standardization (ISO) 
• Electronic Product Code (EPC) 
• European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) 
• Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
 
Each of the standardization organization mentioned above defines a set of standards for 
different RFID applications while ISO supports the required standard for RFID 
frequencies under series of ISO 18000 which are known as Air Interface Family. 
3.2. NFC overview 
Sony and Philips were the first to develop and initiate the NFC technology. Derived 
from RFID and with new added interface and protocols, NFC devices are still 
compatible with RFID technology. 
Several differences separate NFC devices from RFID devices, bidirectional data transfer 
is one of them, also peer to peer communication, where in passive mode only one 
device produces the required radio frequency for the communication and the other 
device utilizes the load modulation for data transmission (Hossein 2012). The device 
that starts the communication is called “initiator” and the receiver is called “Target”. 
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3.2.1. NFC coding and bit representation 
NFC utilizes Manchester coding and modified miller coding schemes to encode the 
commands, responses and data transaction. Manchester coding is one of the most 
common coding techniques applied nowadays, due to its many characteristics. An 
important characteristic is called “self-clocking”, that allows it to be used in inductive 
and capacitive coupling. Also, the clock signal can be recovered from the encoded data. 
Another property is bandwidth efficiency. Less bandwidth is needed to achieve a certain 
data rate, although it may be vulnerable to frequency errors and jitter in the 
sender/receiver reference clock. 
Manchester code ensures frequent line voltage transitions (in the middle of each bit 
duration), directly proportional to the clock rate; this helps clock recovery. Also, it 
means that this coding method has two possible transitions at the middle of a symbol 
period. Manchester coding is shown in both Table 3 and Figure 7.  
Table 3. Machester coding. 
Original Data Clock Manchester Value 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 0 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Manchester Coding. 
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Modified Miller Coding is another coding method used in NFC enabled devices. Ones 
and zeros are defined by the position of the pulse during one bit duration. 
For logic one, the transition from HIGH to LOW happens in the middle of the bit 
duration, the pulse occurs in the second half of the bit period. For logic zero, a pulse 
shall occur at the beginning of the bit period. But when the ZERO bit is preceded by the 
ONE bit, no pulse shall occur during this ZERO, as it is shown in Figure 8 (Standard 
ECMA-373 2012). 
 
Figure 8. Modified Miller Coding. 
                    
3.2.2. NFC characteristics (frequency and data rates) 
NFC is designed for short range communications - maximum theoretical range of 20 cm 
but practically around 4 cm - operating in the globally available unlicensed band of 
13.56 MHz with a bandwidth of 14 KHz. It supports data rates of 106 kbps, 212 kbps, 
and 424kbps. Higher bit rates are possible depending on future development. NFC uses 
half duplex channel (same frequency is used for sending and receiving data). To prevent 
collision, NFC devices utilize Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) protocol. NFC 
characteristics are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4. NFC Characteristic 
Rate Speed Active Device Passive Device Description 
fCLK/128 106 Mod. Miller, 
100% ASK 
Man, 10% 
ASK 
The sent signal is the product of an AND 
operation between the coded data using 
modified miller bit and the clock signal. 
The length of the modified miller bit 
coded pulse varies between 7 and 45 
cycles long. 
fCLK/64 212 Man, 10% 
ASK 
Man, 10% 
ASK 
The sent signal is the product of an XOR 
operation between the data coded using 
Manchester Bit-Coding and the Clock 
Signal. 
fCLK/32 424 Man, 10% 
ASK 
Man, 10% 
ASK 
The same as 212 Kbps Data Rate. 
 
3.2.3. Communication modes 
As in RFID devices, NFC has two modes of communication, depending on the device 
itself. If the device can generate its own radio frequency field, then it is called active, 
otherwise it is passive. Active communication mode occurs when two active devices 
communicate with each other, passive mode requires one active device. 
The International Standard specifies requirements for modulation, bit rates and bit 
coding. In addition, it specifies requirements for the start of communication, the end of 
communication, the bit and byte representation, the framing and error detection, the 
single device detection, the protocol and parameter selection, and the data exchange and 
de-selection of Near Field Communication Interface and Protocol (NFCIP-1) devices 
(ISO/IEC 18092 2013(E)). The transaction of commands, responses, and data starts with 
the devices initialisation and end with the device de-selection, in alternating or half 
duplex channel. 
The devices are capable of establishing the transaction using 106/kbps, 212/kbps, or 
424/kbps. The initiator selects one of those bit rates, the bit rate may be changed during 
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the transaction using certain commands and protocols. However, the mode of the 
communication (active or passive) cannot be changed. 
In the Active communication mode, both the initiator and the target use their own RF 
field to communicate. The initiator starts the NFC protocol (NFCIP-1) transaction. The 
target responds to an initiator command in the active communication mode by 
modulating its own RF field. (ISO/IEC 18092 2013(E)) 
• 106 Kbps data transmission (low rate)  
The initial speed of any transaction is always the lowest rate possible of 106 
Kbps. At this rate the initiator apply 100% ASK modulation to generate the 
required pulse (Hossein 2012). The coding technique used for this rate is the 
modified miller coding. The serial data transmission systems send the least 
significant byte first (LSB) followed by the rest of the data. 
 
• 212/424 Kbps data transmission (high rate) 
The modulation scheme used for these rates is still ASK. However, the index is 
different, for these rates the modulation indexes are 8% and 30% of the 
operating field. The serial data transmission systems send the most significant 
byte first (MSB) followed by the rest of the data, also the reserve polarity in the 
amplitude of the Manchester symbols is allowed. The target shall respond with 
the same load modulation scheme but the bit duration must be altered to the 
actual bit rate (Ecma 2004). 
In the passive communication mode, the initiator generates the RF field and starts the 
transaction. The target responds to the initiator command in the passive communication 
mode by modulating the initiators’ RF field, which is referred to as load modulation 
(ISO/IEC 18092 2013(E)). 
The communication between the initiator and the target follows the same procedures as 
in the active mode (since the initiator generates its own RF field). The response from the 
target to the initiator; however, it follows different procedures. 
The target responds by load modulation which generates a sub carrier with frequency of 
(fs=fCLK/16). The load modulated signal’s amplitude has to be greater than the existing 
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magnetic field strength threshold. The signal is coded using Manchester coding, and the 
bytes are encoded with LSB first for the lower data rate (106 kbps) and MSB first for 
the high bit rates (212 and 424 kbps). 
3.2.4. NFC protocols 
All NFC enabled devices are in target state by default, to preserve power and not to 
disturb any on-going communication in the vicinity. All NFC devices will not generate 
an RF field.  The device changes its state upon a request from the control unit (program 
on the mobile device or computer) to be an initiator, the program determines the 
communication mode and the data rate. The initiator use collision avoidance protocol to 
detect any existing radio field before initiating communication with the target, the target 
device waits for the initiator field to respond. 
In collision avoidance procedure, the initiator “listens” and tries to detect if there is any 
other RF field. After a certain amount of time known as the guard time, the device can 
initiate communication if no RF field is detected in order to prevent disturbing other 
NFC devices. If two or more targets answer the initiator’s field simultaneously then a 
collision will be detected and simply the frames will be discarded. Collision avoidance 
is defined to avoid similar issues and to minimize disturbance with other on-going 
communications at the same frequency, the initiator should not generate any RF field 
until the time of the existing field is terminated (ETSI 2003). Figure 9 describes the 
general initialization and single device detection (SDD) for the active and passive 
communication mode at different transfer speeds. 
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Figure 9. Initialization and single device detection (Near Field Communication -Interface and Protocol (NFCIP-1)) 
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3.2.5. Frame formatting 
The data exchanged in NFC vary from one to another depending on the source (initiator 
or target) and on the mode of communication (active or passive). For each type, the data 
is grouped in what is called frames. The basic frame format for the initiator and target is 
shown in the Figure 10. 
Start of communication (START) Information End of communication (END) 
Figure 10. Initiator and target general frame format. 
 
3.2.6. Passive communication mode 
In initialization and single device detection for 106 kbps in passive mode, two frame 
formats are used at the 106kbps data rate. The short format which consists of 7 bits is 
used in the initialization step. The initialization short frame is presented in Figure 11. 
 Bit 0 Bit 1 Bit 2 Bit 3 Bit 4 Bit5 Bit 6  
START Commands END 
Figure 11. Initialization step Short frame format at 106kbps. 
 
After the initialization step, standard frame format is used for data transfer at 106 kbps, 
the standard frame format is shown in the Figure 12. 
 
SB LEN CMD0 CMD1 Byte 0 Byte 1 Byte 2 …… Byte n E1 
Figure 12. Standard frame format at 106kbps. 
 
SB byte stands for “Start Byte” in the data exchange protocol at fc/128 and is set to 
0xF0. LEN defines the length of the transport data field plus 1, and E1 declares the end 
of transmission. 
Initialization and single device detection for 212 & 424 kbps in passive communication 
mode starts once the carrier frequency field is detected. The communication starts with 
Transport Data Field 
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the minimum preamble sequence of 48 bits Manchester encoded ZERO. The end of the 
communication is declared in the length field of the frame. 
The frame format consists of Preamble, SYNC, Length, Payload, and CRC fields. They 
are defined in Figure 13 (Near Field Communication -Interface and Protocol (NFCIP-
1)). 
Preamble SYNC Length Payload CRC 
Figure 13. Standard frame format.  
 
Preamble: 48 bits minimum all logical ZEROs. Its function is to signal the beginning of 
communication. 
SYNC: bytes. The 1st byte of the SYNC is ‘B2’ and the 2nd byte is ‘4D’. This frame is 
to synchronize the field frequency with target clock frequency. 
Length: an 8-bit field and it is set equal to the number of bytes to be transmitted in 
Payload plus 1. The range of the Length is between 2 and 255. Other settings are 
reserved for future use “RFU”. 
Payload: consists of N number of bytes of data. 
CRC: Are the cyclic redundancy check bits. 
Basic method of single device detection (SDD) at 212 and 424 kbps is the Time Slot 
method. The initiator sends polling requests, the target responds at random in each time 
slot. The target’s identification number for passive communication mode (NFCID2) will 
be read by the initiator. Once the NFCID2 data from the target is obtained, in the 
operating field, the initiator can communicate with multiple targets. 
In order to find a target, the initiator sends a Polling Request frame, which is a standard 
frame format with predefined parameters and values such as the synchronization bits 
and the payload. 
Similar to the polling request, the polling request response is also a standard frame with 
some predefined parameters. Instead of the regular values in the payload, the polling 
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request response payload consists of one byte set to ‘01’, the NFCID2 data, and the Pad 
information which shall be ignored for data interchange. Other differences in the length 
segment and CRC bits. Synchronization bits and preamble are the same in the polling 
request and the polling request response. 
3.2.7. Passive communication mode activation flow 
The initiator performs the initial RF collision avoidance sequence. After that, it 
performs the initialization and single device detection for passive communication mode 
at a chosen transfer speed. The target checks the protocol at different transfer speed 
according to the attribute request. If the attribute request is not supported by the target, 
the target may fall back to the initialization and single device detection. The attribute 
response is sent by the target as an answer to the attribute request sent by the initiator. 
The target shall only answer if the request is received directly after the selection. If the 
target supports any changeable parameter in the attribute request, a parameter selection 
request may be used by the initiator as the next command after receiving the attribute 
request to change parameters. The target response to the initiator request, but if it does 
not support the change of parameters, then the target does not need to compliment on 
the request of the initiator. The data exchange transport protocol will be active now and 
the transparent data will be sent. 
The Initiator activation sequence for a target in the passive communication mode is seen 
in Figure 14 (ISO/IEC 18092 2013) 
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Figure 14 Activation protocol in Passive communication mode 
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2.2.8. Active communication mode 
In the initialization stage, the application controls the device and switches to initiator for 
active communication mode, choosing one of the three data rates. The active 
communication mode RF with collision avoidance works in the following way. First the 
initiator performs an initial RF collision avoidance, by first sending the “attribute 
request” command in the active communication mode at the selected transfer speed. 
Second, the initiator switches off the RF field in order to allow the target to perform the 
response RF collision avoidance, the target sends “attribute response” command in the 
same speed chosen by the initiator and switches off the RF field. Then the initiator 
performs the response RF collision avoidance. After that, the initiator sends “the 
parameter selection request” in order to change parameter or sends the “data exchange 
protocol” to start the data exchange protocol.  
In case of two targets or more in the field, the initiator chooses only one target and 
ignores the others. And if the two targets answer in the exact same time period, the 
initiator will discard targets as it will detect a collision and will resend the “attribute 
request” as described earlier. 
The transport protocol is handled in three stages: first is the Activation of the protocol, 
which includes the Request for Attributes and the Parameter Selection. The second 
stage is the data exchange protocol, and finally the deactivation of the protocol 
including the Deselect and the Release. 
The position of the data field varies depending on the data transfer rate, for each data 
rate the frame format is different. The transport data rate field contains the mandatory 
command bytes and the data bytes. 
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3.2.9. Active communication mode Activation flow 
In active communication mode, the initiator at first performs an initial RF Collision 
avoidance sequence, and then it will switch to active communication mode and select 
the transfer speed. After that, the initiator sends an attribute request. The target in the 
operating field will send a response to the initiator request, in case more than one target 
responded, the initiator will detect a collision and the attribute request will be re-sent. 
Once one target responds successfully, the device is selected and the initiator may send 
a parameter selection request depending on the attribute response sent by the target, 
otherwise if the target does not support any changeable parameter, it does not need to 
complement on the initiator request. The Initiator activation sequence for a target in the 
active communication mode is shown in Figure 15 (ISO/IEC 18092 2013). 
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Figure 15. Activation protocol in Active communication mode 
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3.2.10. NFC communication modes 
NFC Interface and Protocol (NFCIP-1) is defined by ECMA-340 and ISO/IEC-18092, 
which presents the operation modes of NFC devices – passive or active – and the 
transfer speed rates. This protocol alongside the ISO14443 (Contactless card standard) 
and ISO 15693 (Vicinity cards) have been expanded to the Near Field Communication 
Interface and Protocol-2 (NFCIP-2) to form The EMCA-352 (ISO/IEC-21481) standard. 
In this way any NFCIP-2 compliant device is compatible with all devices 
communicating on 13.4MHz. These standards led to three basics communication 
modes, Peer-to-peer, Read/Write, and Card Emulation mode. (Van Damme and Wouters 
2009) 
Peer to Peer (Near Field Communication, NFC) is the classic mode of communication. 
By holding to active devices in each other’s operating range, a connection is established 
on the link level, allowing data to transfer at rate up to 424Kbps. This mode follows the 
Master/Slave principle of communication. 
In Read/Write Reader/Writer Mode (Proximity Coupling Device, PCD), when passive 
NFC compatible tag or a passive smart card is in the range of an active NFC capable 
device, the active device switches to be an initiator. The tag is energized, the initiator is 
able to read data from the tag, and write data as well. Depending on the running 
application, data transfer rate depends on the tags properties; 106Kbps is supported in 
this mode. 
Card Emulator (Proximity Inductive Coupling Card, PICC) mode is at which the NFC 
enabled device acts as smart card following ISO 14443 Protocols. An external NFC 
reader will “see” the device as a smart card, and the reader is able to read information 
from device. 
Figure 16 illustrates the differences in the communication modes. 
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Figure 16. NFC Communication Modes 
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3.3. Smart Cards 
The vast variety of applications served by smart cards makes categorizing them a hard 
task. However, there are two properties that help separating the smart cards into major 
categories; these are processing power, and connection type. 
Memory cards are the first type of smart cards and they were used for telephone 
applications, as prepaid cards. The value was stored electronically in the chip, and it 
was decreased every time the card is used. Security measures were added to the cards in 
this application to eliminate manipulation and any other exploits. These pre-paid cards 
were used as a one-time use only, once the balance stored in the cards is depleted, the 
cards cannot be recharged and are no longer useful. 
The main advantage of this type of cards is the simplicity of its implementation, which 
makes the cost to manufacture them very low. However, since they cannot be reused 
again once empty, they must be discarded. Memory cards have limited functionality due 
to their simplicity, protecting the stored data is possible, but they are mainly used in 
application where low cost is the primary concern. 
The other type is processor cards. As the name implies, these cards contain embedded 
processors. The embedded processor and memory in the cards make them flexible to 
serve more applications due to their ability to store secret keys securely and execute 
modern cryptographic algorithms. The only restriction on the functionality of the card is 
the available resources – memory and computing power – otherwise, the developer can 
program the card as needed. The most wide spread application of processor cards is 
their use as access medium for the European Digital Mobile Telephone system (GSM), 
partially because of the high security level that they can achieve while accessing the 
mobile telephone network. The other main reason is that they have provided new 
possibilities for both the network operators and service providers to sell their products 
separately. Other applications of processor cards mainly demand a high level of 
security, such as personal identification in some restricted areas or on some computers 
or equipment, banking information for credit or debit cards are also another field where 
processor cards are used. 
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The ability to perform cryptographic algorithms and the ability to securely store 
confidential data are the essential advantages of processor cards makes use processor 
cards in new application is inevitable. The steady decline of production cost due to mass 
production and ongoing technological progress helps further expands the use of smart 
cards. 
The previous two types of smart cards are based on the processing power abilities of the 
card. Another property which can be used to categorize smart cards is the connection 
type. This includes contact and contactless cards 
Contact Cards need to have a physical connection with the terminal. This connection is 
done via the connection plate in the card. Through this connection the card is energized 
and can transfer data from and to the terminal. Contact cards can be memory cards or 
processor cards, depending on the application and where the card is used. 
Contactless cards do not need a physical connection with the terminal. The connection 
between contactless cards and the terminal is established though an RF link. 
Inexpensive, mature, and mass produced contactless cards are available nowadays in 
both memory cards and processor cards forms. This is the result of the rapid progress in 
integrated circuit technology and the dramatic decrease in power consumption, allowing 
the energy and data to be transferred to and from the card without any electrical contact. 
Contactless cards range of operation is limited to few centimeters for power 
conservation reasons, it is possible to extend this range up to a meter away from the 
terminal, however the close range of operation increases the contactless cards security 
level. An attacker can read the content of the card and might even manipulate it without 
the knowledge of the card owner, if the range was relatively longer. 
Dual interface cards are considered to be a possible solution to this particular problem. 
However, operation over a long distance should be prevented due to the high risk of 
security breach. Contactless smart cards are suitable for applications that demand quick 
identification, such as access control, public transportations, airline tickets and luggage 
identification and many others. (Rankl & Effing 2010: p9) 
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3.3.1. Physical Properties 
The smart cards physical properties determines the cards format, material, placement of 
different components such as magnetic strips, chip module and its connections and 
many others. The card can also include embossing, holograms and other features.  
The application where the smart card is used dictates many of its physical attributes. For 
example, if the operation environment is subject to high ambient temperatures, then 
both the smart card's body as well as the embedded microcontroller, must meet all the 
relevant requirements, individually and collectively. 
The most notable property of the smart card is its format. This format is standardized by 
ISO7810 also known as “ID-1 Format”, as shown in the Figure 17. (ISO 7810) 
 
Figure 17. The ID-1 format as specified in ISO 7810. 
 
However, this standard was issued in 1985, and at that time the idea of adding an 
integrated circuit to a card was not available. With the large variety of cards, each card 
has distinct dimensions to suit a particular application, it is not easy to determine 
whether a card is an ID-1 smart card or not. Besides having an integrated chip, an easy 
way to identify a smart card is to measure the card’s thickness - contactless smart cards 
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may not have a visible circuit on their surface - if its 0.76 mm then the card is a smart 
card (in reference to ISO 7810 Standards). 
Other factors related to the card body, construction and material are determined by the 
designated function of that particular card. The mechanical attributes are also 
considered when manufacturing a card, depending on the environment at which the card 
is expected to operate. In order to protect the card from getting damaged, several 
properties must be inspected to ensure a high level of quality. These tests include 
mechanical robustness of the card, temperature resistance, electrostatic discharge, 
electromagnetic susceptibility, and many others. 
 
3.3.2. Smart Card Micro Controllers 
The key component of any smart card is the embedded microcontroller. It controls, 
initiates, and monitors all of the card's electrical activities. The smart cards 
microcontrollers have the setup of a full computer, they have a processor, memory 
(RAM, ROM EEPROM), and input and output interface to external devices. This 
hardware configuration must be governed by a suitably adapted and configured 
operating system which is tailored to fit different applications such as payments or 
telecommunication.  Figure 18 illustrates the basic building blocks of a microcontroller. 
 
Figure 18. possible arrangement for essential functional components of a simple smart card microcontroller on the 
    silicon die 
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The microcontrollers used in smart cards are not standard, widely available units, they 
are specially designed to serve a particular purpose. Some of the components from 
which the microcontrollers are made of however are already developed items for other 
ends, for example, the processors used in smart cards are not special designs, but instead 
proven components that have been used in other areas for a long time. Reasons behind 
this approach beside the high expense needed, is the complexity of developing a brand 
new processor with no suitable libraries and no available operating systems. Also, the 
processor in the microcontroller is not a special design, in addition to the stated reasons, 
the processor is the most important part of the microcontroller, and that’s why it must be 
very reliable. Older processors which have been tested and proven reliable are used. 
(Rankl & Effing 2010: p73) 
Several factors must be taken into consideration in the development of microcontrollers, 
to name a few: 
Manufacturing costs, the structure width and the area of the microcontroller chip on the 
silicon wafer are the most critical factors regarding the manufacturing cost. Constant 
efforts are made to minimize the cost by reducing the chip area, also omitting any 
unnecessary additional components that occupy space without any useful functionality. 
Functionality, this reason is closely related to the previous one. The area of the chip is 
very limited, and therefore only the components that provide the needed functionalities 
are included along the essential blocks of the microcontroller, anything else is omitted. 
Security, smart cards provide tamper-proof storage of user and account 
identity. Smart cards also provide vital components of system security for the 
exchange of data throughout various types of networks. They protect against a 
full range of security threats, from careless storage of user passwords to 
sophisticated system hacks. Multifunction cards can also serve as network 
system access and store values and other data. (Smart card security basics, 
Cardlogix publication 2009) 
Chip area is not only important from the cost point of view, but also from quality 
reasons, larger chips are more prone to be mechanically damaged. Smart cards are 
meant to be used in various situation hence, it is important that the card can handle 
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mechanical stress, most importantly the chip must handle a certain degree of mechanical 
stress, the finest hairline crack in the chip is sufficient to render the smart card useless. 
In order to analyze the microcontrollers used in smart cards, it is necessary to analyze 
the components from which it is made. This include the processor, memory types, 
input/output interface and any other additional items used for a particular functionality 
A typical microcontroller used in smart card application is an 8-bit processor with 
complex instruction set computer architecture (CISC). It has a memory capacity of 50-
100 KB. And it is used without any significant limitations, which means it needs several 
clock cycles to execute each machine instruction and usually has a very large instruction 
set. 
However 8-bit processors are not the only type of processors used in smart cards 
microcontrollers. To handle more complex tasks, 16-bit processors are used. They are 
based on architecture similar to RSIC architecture (‘RISC’ stands for ‘reduced-
instruction-set computer’). 
More recently, the highest performance possible can be attained from using 32-bit 
processors in smart cards microcontrollers. The direction of the development is heading 
towards 32-bits processors, due to the need for improved performance and for managing 
larger memories. The key selection criteria for processors include code density, power 
consumption, and resistance to attacks. 
8-bits processors provide a solid basis for inexpensive microcontrollers at the lower end 
of the performance scale. Their power consumption and the area they occupy on the die 
are smaller compared to the 32-bits processor. However, 32-bits processors are needed 
for the more demanding application, for the processing power they can provide, with 
their broad bus structures and more elaborate internal components. (Rankl & Effing 
2010: p82 ) 
The other major component that affects the performance of the microcontroller is the 
memory. Different memory types are used in the microcontroller for various tasks, some 
of which are not essentials but to provide certain functionality. Different types of 
memory are illustrated in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Memory types used in smart card microcontrollers. PROM and EPROM are normally not used in modern 
    microcontrollers. FRAM is presently used relatively rarely in smart cards 
 
The main two types of memory are separated by the way they maintain the data stored 
on them. Volatile memory requires power to maintain the stored information. It retains 
its contents while powered, but when power is interrupted stored data is immediately 
lost. Non-Volatile Memory on the other hand maintains its content even when 
unpowered. 
RAM is an abbreviation for (Random-Access Memory) and it is a volatile memory. The 
number of accesses to the memory content is unlimited, the content can be modified by 
the running program as much as needed, as long the supply voltage is uninterrupted, the 
content of the memory will be intact. 
ROM stands for Read-Only Memory. This type of memory can only be read and cannot 
be written, supply voltage is not needed to retain the data. A smart card’s ROM contains 
most of the operating system routines, as well as various test and diagnostic functions. 
These programs are built into the chip by its manufacturer when it is fabricated. 
EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Read-Only Memory) is technically more complex than 
ROM or RAM, it is used to store all the programs and data that need to be modified or 
deleted at some time. Its function resembles the hard drive function in a computer, since 
it retains data in the absence of power and the data can be altered as necessary. 
The main goal is to minimize the required RAM and EEPROM in order to save space 
on the chip, since the RAM and EEPROM requires more space. As a rule of thumb, a 
RAM cell occupies about four times as much space as an EEPROM cell, which in turn 
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occupies four times as much space as a ROM cell. Other types of memory might be 
used to provide a certain function, such as flash EEPROM “Flash memory” or FRAM 
“Ferroelectric Random-Access Memory”. (Rankl & Effing 2010: p83) 
Supplementary hardware are added in order to meet some requirements which the 
standard components cannot meet using only software. These requirements might not be 
fundamental tasks that are not possible to be done using software, but enhancement to 
improve the execution time and the power consumption. Some of these additional 
features include communication with a USB interface, Communication with MMC 
“MultiMedia Card”, the USB hardware enables the higher-level software layer to select 
a large number of configuration settings for the driver software. Like USB, MMC 
entails a large amount of additional hardware in the smart card microcontroller. 
Communication with Single Wire Protocol (SWP). This is used for communication 
between a SIM and an NFC controller in a mobile telephone. 
Additional components include a Timer, CRC “Cyclic Redundancy Check” Calculation 
Unit, a Random Number Generator, for security reasons all modern smart card 
microcontrollers have hardware random number generators. 
In performance demanding application, clock generator and clock multiplier are used. 
The processing power is proportional to the clock frequency, doubling the clock 
frequency will roughly double the performance of the processor. However due to 
current consumption and other compatibility issues, it is not always possible to 
maximize the clock frequency. Other components for improving the performance 
include DMA (Direct Memory Access), MMU (Memory Management Unit), Java 
Accelerator, Coprocessors for symmetric and/or asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, 
and many others. Figure 20 illustrates a block diagram of high performance smart card 
microcontroller. 
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Figure 20. the usual functional units of a high-performance smart card microcontroller 
  
3.3.3. Contactless Smart Cards 
Contactless Smart cards refers to cards that do not require an electrical connection with 
the terminal to exchange data, power, and clock signal. All transmissions are done 
wirelessly over a short distance. Contactless smart cards must follow the smart cards 
standard - ID-1 format. The lack of electrical connection alongside the infeasibility of 
adding batteries to the card means the only way to transfer power to the card is via using 
the passive technique, in which the terminal provides the power signal through 
electromagnetic waves and the smart cards harness this power. This could be done in 
several ways, the most commonly used methods are radio waves or microwaves, optical 
transmission, capacitive coupling, and inductive coupling. 
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The main interests lies within the capacitive and inductive coupling since they are the 
most suitable for the flat shapes of the smart cards, also they are similar to the coupling 
techniques used in NFC devices. As seen in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. An inlay foil for a contactless smart card with inductive coupling using an etched coil 
 
All cards that employ inductive coupling share the same principle. Coils enclose a large 
area of the cards are incorporated in the cards body, they serve as the antenna for 
receiving the power signal and also for sending and receiving data signals from and to 
the card. The coils are connected to one or more chip depending on the design of the 
smart card. (Rankl & Effing 2010: p285) 
Capacitive coupling utilizes a different technique to achieve coupling. Conductive 
surfaces are incorporated in the cards body and in the terminal as well. These surfaces 
act as the two sides of a capacitor when the card is in close proximity to the terminal. 
The capacitance that can be obtained depends on the sizes of the coupling surfaces and 
the distance of the separation, but since the size of the card is limited by the ID-1 
Format standards, considering the manufacturing costs, several picofarads can be 
obtained from a card manufactured at an acceptable level of cost and effort. This is not 
enough to power the microcontroller inside the smart card, hence this method is used 
only for data transmission, while the operating power is obtained by an inductive 
coupling. This mixed method is standardized in ISO/IEC 10536 for close-coupling 
cards, and as the name suggests, this method is limited to short coupling distances. 
For collision avoidance two standards have been defined in ISO/IEC 14443-3, both 
based on time division multiple access (TDMA), they ensure that individual cards have 
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different timing behaviors, so they can be distinguished from one another at the 
terminal. 
Due to the large number of applications in which contactless smart cards can be used, 
also the different optimization and customization each application requires. ISO and 
IEC began a standardization process for contactless smart cards in 1988. 
Contactless smart cards can operate in range of one centimeter to one meter, this range 
has a significant effect on the transmission of power and data. Consequently, it is not 
possible to cover all contactless cards by one standard which offers technical solution to 
all of the requirements needed from the various applications. Presently, there are three 
different standards describing the contactless cards, each one is defined for a specific 
distance range, as mentioned in Table 5 
Table 5. Completed ISO/IEC standards for contactless smart cards. Each standard consists of several parts 
Standard Type of contactless smart card Range Category 
ISO/IEC 10536 Close coupling (CICC) ≈ 1 cm Close Coupling Cards 
ISO/IEC 14443 Proximity coupling (PICC) ≈ 10 cm Remote Coupling Cards 
ISO/IEC 15693 Vicinity coupling (VICC) ≈ 1 m Remote Coupling Cards 
 
Close integrated circuit cards (ISO/IEC 14443) 
Close coupling utilizes capacitive coupling for data transmission and inductive coupling 
for powering the integrated circuit in the cards body. The ISO/IEC 10536 standard is 
designated for “Slot or surface operation”. Indicating the card must be inserted in a slot 
or laid on a marked area of the terminal, due to its short range (maximum of 1 cm). 
The term “remote Coupling” encompasses smart cards that can transmit data over a 
range extending from few centimeters to approximately one meter from the terminal. 
Inserting the card or laying it on the marked surface on the terminal is not required, 
offering more flexibility and various applications. Examples of such applications are 
access control, vehicle identification, electronic tickets, local public transport, ski 
passes, airline tickets, electronic purses, and baggage identification. (Rankl & Effing 
2010: p296). The diversity of these applications requires many different technical 
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implementations. The ISO/IEC 14443 and ISO/IEC 15633 standards address coupling 
ranges up to 10 cm and 1 m, respectively. 
Proximity integrated circuit cards (ISO/IEC 14443) 
The ISO/IEC 14443 standard, which is titled ‘Identification cards – Contactless 
integrated circuits cards – Proximity cards’, describes the properties and operating 
principles of contactless smart cards with a range of approximately 10 cm. The amount 
of power that can be transmitted over this range is sufficient to operate a 
microprocessor. A large number of contactless cards have also contacts in addition to 
coupling components, in order to make them compatible with an existing infrastructure 
for contact cards. This type of cards is called “dual-interface cards”. The ISO/IEC 
14443 standard is formulated such that it is compatible with ISO/IEC 7816 (the standard 
for contact smart cards) at the application level, to ensure the formats for exchanging 
data between the card and the terminal are the same. Hence commands and data can be 
exchanged between the card and the reader using the contact or the contactless interface. 
(Rankl & Effing 2010: p297) 
The maximum operational range is 10 cm might not be suitable for all applications, but 
it has other advantages which make these Proximity cards useful. The short range of 
operation provides a certain amount of protection against undesired access to the card. 
Large antennas in the immediate vicinity of a terminal are necessary for eavesdropping 
on data transmissions, this could hardly be installed in an unobtrusive manner. In 
addition to encryption and authentication, the immunity against attacks is very robust. 
Several amendments were introduced to the standard in order to increase the data rate 
among other requirements. The clarity of the standard is reduced by the large number of 
amendments. Therefore, the responsible ISO/IEC group is working on a revised version 
of the standard. 
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Vicinity integrated circuit cards (ISO/IEC 15693) 
ISO/IEC 15693, ‘Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuits cards –Vicinity 
cards’, describes the properties and operating modes of contactless smart cards with a 
range up to 1 meter. Complying with ISO/IEC 14443, the minimum activation field 
strength needed for vicinity cards is reduced, due to the restriction on the maximum 
allowable magnetic field strength. The reduced field strength leads to inefficient power 
to operate the microcontrollers in the cards. For that reason, only simple memory ICs 
with relatively simple security logic (a state machine) can be used. There is also a 
security issue associated with the larger working range. Thus it is possible for a terminal 
to establish a connection to a card without the desire or knowledge of the cardholder. 
Whether such undesired and unnoticed card accesses pose security risks depends on the 
application. (Rankl & Effing 2010: p344) 
NEAR FIELD COMMUNICATION (NFC) 
Proximity Coupling Cards and Near Field Communication (NFC) share the same 
standards (ISO/IEC 14443). Although NFC has some other standards on its own, the 
overlapping of these two technologies in several applications is the main reason to study 
them in parallel. Just as in Proximity coupling cards, the short range of operation in 
NFC devices prevents unintentional data transfer between equipment and terminal and 
is thus suitable for use in many applications with relatively simple security mechanisms. 
NFC Protocols has been covered in the previous titles. 
The use of NFC devices on contactless terminals is possible, because contactless 
terminals are not dependent on the ID-1 Card Format. Instead NFC device must be 
located within range of the terminal. NFC devices, contactless cards and contactless 
terminals support the ISO/IEC 14443 standards. (Rankl & Effing 2010: p348) 
One of the main target applications for NFC technology is contactless payment using 
mobile devices. To achieve that goal, security component in the NFC-capable mobile 
device is a prerequisite for mobile payment. Three options for integrating a security 
component in a mobile device are currently under discussion. 
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The first two options share the same concept of integrating a security component in the 
mobile device (Secure Element). The first option this element could be an already 
approved smart card microcontroller to host the payment application. The 
microcontroller is permanently integrated in the mobile device. To achieve the same 
security level as with a corresponding smart card. One problem with this solution is 
maintaining the interchangeability of the mobile equipment, since the application is 
permanently tied to the equipment. In the second option the secure element is an 
external secure memory card (such as a secure microSD card). In this case, the security 
chip is stored in the memory card next to the flash memory. The user can transfer the 
payment application to a different mobile device by changing the memory card. 
In the third option, the secure element is not a part of the mobile device, the SIM or 
USIM card contains the payment application. The application can be stored directly in 
the SIM microcontroller or in a supplementary security chip in the SIM or USIM 
module. A supplementary security chip has the advantage that only this chip needs to be 
certified. 
In any case, it is necessary to devise a solution for secure loading and personalization of 
the payment application in the security component. This process must be performed by 
a trustworthy entity that is certified for payment systems. (Rankl & Effing 2010: p351). 
Several examples are displayed in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Several options for integrating a security component for NFC in a mobile device 
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The expanding spread of NFC and RFID systems in different applications necessitate 
the use of security measures to protect against attempted attacks. Modern encryption 
and authentication protocols employ suitable algorithms to prevent unauthorized access 
or use of the RFID systems. High-security RFID systems must have a defense against 
the following individual attacks: 
• Skimming of a data carrier in order to clone and/or modify data. 
• Placing a foreign data carrier within the interrogation zone of a reader with the 
intention of gaining unauthorized access to a building or receiving services without 
payment. 
• Eavesdropping on radio communications and replaying the data, in order to imitate a 
genuine data carrier ‘replay and fraud’. 
Consideration should be given to cryptographic functions when selecting a suitable 
RFID system. Applications that do not require a security function (e.g. industrial 
automation, tool recognition) would be made unnecessarily expensive by the 
incorporation of cryptographic procedures. On the other hand, in high-security 
applications (e.g. ticketing, payment systems) the omission of cryptographic procedures 
can be a very expensive oversight if manipulated transponders are used to gain access to 
services without authorization. (Finkenzeller 2010: p226) 
Within the scope of this work, several algorithms will be analyzed from different point 
of view. In order to establish a basic understanding of the cryptographic abilities of 
RFID tags, NFC tags and smart cards. Tests will include brute force attack, encryption 
and decryption times, power consumed during encryption and decryption, and an 
overall performance analysis. 
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4. Practical Part 
4.1. Encryption Algorithms 
The wide variety of Cryptographic algorithms can be split into two major categories, 
symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric algorithms use the same key for encryption and 
decryption, while asymmetric algorithms (which were first postulated in 1976 by 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman) use different keys for encryption and 
decryption. 
The algorithms chosen to be tested are Caesar, DES/3DES, AES, and Blowfish. 
 
4.1.1. Caesar 
Also known as Shift cipher, Caesar cipher is one of the oldest and most known 
encryption techniques. In which each letter is “shifted” by a fixed number of 
letters, so a shift of 3 will make the letter “a” become “d”. The method is 
named after Julius Caesar, who used it in his private correspondence. In the 
original form the range of letter which can be shifted was limited to the number 
of letters in the alphabet. Nowadays although the Caesar cipher is considered 
the weakest form of encryption, in the computer world the shift range is wider 
than the original, at a range of (32-126), it includes letters, numbers, and 
special symbols such as “#” and “space”. the minimum effort needed to break 
the code is the main reason why the Caesar cipher is not used. Applying brute 
force attack on the ciphered text can resolve in finding the key. Even without 
the use of a computer, a brute force attack on a Caesar ciphered text is carried 
out by either shifting the ciphered text one letter at a time until the right key is 
found, or by using frequency analysis which will even shorten the time needed 
for breaking the code. In each language there are several letters which are used 
more than others, in the English language for example the letter “e” is the most 
reoccurring letter in the alphabet and by graphing the most occurring letter in a 
ciphered text to the most occurring letter in a certain language, and the code is 
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broken. Figure 23 display the frequency of letters in the English language. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caesar_cipher) 
 
Figure 23. The distribution of letters in a typical sample of English language text.
 
 
48 
 
4.1.2. DES/3DES 
Developed by IBM in collaboration with the US National Bureau of Standards (NBS) 
and published in 1977 as the FIPS 46 standard. DES was fashioned in accordance with 
Kerckhoff’s principle, which meant it could be published without impairing its security. 
DES is a symmetric block encryption algorithm that does not expand the ciphertext, 
which means that the plaintext and ciphertext blocks have the same size. The block size 
is 64 bits (8 bytes), which is also the key size, although only 56 of these bits are used as 
the actual key. Coding is done in 19 phases of substitution and permutation operations. 
The Figure 24 illustrate the general phases in the DES encryption. 
(http://dc242.4shared.com/doc/ZDomPSx_/preview.html) 
 
Figure 24. General description of DES encryption algorithm.  
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Before the encryption starts, the key is extended from 56 bits to 64 bits, and then 
rotating the key generates a  new keys Ki for each phase (i = 1, . . . , 16). 
The text is permutated in the first phase of the encryption, after that the rounds of 
permutations, begins, using the corresponding Ki generated from the originally extended 
key. After 16 round of permutation, the two halves of the block (two 32 bits blocks) are 
interchanged, and in the final phase, the first permutation is revered. 
The security of DES can be increased by triple DES coding “3DES”. In 3DES, two keys 
K1 and K2 are needed. The way to change DES to 3DES is firstly the Plaintext block is 
coded by K1. Secondly, Result is decoded by K2. (Note as K2 is the wrong key, the 
result is not the original text but even more mixed.). And finally the previous result is 
coded again by K1. This is the result of 3DES. Decoding is done in reverse order using 
the same keys. (Penttonen 2011) 
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4.1.3. AES 
AES is a symmetric block encryption algorithm with a block length of 128 bits (16 
bytes) that can be used with three different key sizes, thus called AES-128, AES-192 or 
AES-256, depending on the key size (the number denote the key size). AES is suitable 
for hardware implementation, and can also be implemented in software running on low-
performance 8-bit processors or high-performance 16-bit and 32-bit processors. 
The size of the key space of AES with a 128-bit key is 2128 (≈ 3.4×1038), which is a 
factor of 4.7×1021 larger than the key space of DES with a 56-bit key. The larger key 
space of the AES grants higher security level against known attacks. 
The basic structure of AES is substitution-permutation network. The cipher takes the 
plaintext block size of 128 bits. The key sizes can be 128, 192 or 256 bits. (Wikipedia 
AES 2012a.) 
Figure 25 illustrates the general steps of encrypting plain text using AES with different 
key sizes.                                                    
(http://developer.amd.com/resources/documentation-articles/articles- whitepapers/bulk-
encryption-on-gpus.) 
 
Figure 25. General description of DES encryption algorithm. 
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Key expansion means that the provided key as input is expanded into an array of forty-
four 32-bit words. Four distinct words (128 bits) serve as a round key for each round. 
There are 10-14 rounds in AES depending on the key size, each round has several steps: 
• Substitute bytes: Uses a Substitution box to perform a byte-by-byte substitution of the 
block. 
• ShiftRows: is the row forward shift process. The first row remains the same. For the 
second row, shift to left 1-byte circular. For the third row, shift to left 2-byte circular. 
Then the fourth row, shift to left 3-byte circular. 
• MixColumns: is a forward mix column transformation. A substitution that makes use 
of arithmetic over Galois Field (28) 
• AddRoundKey: A bitwise XOR of the current block with a portion of the expanded 
key. 
The final round is different because it omits the “mix columns” step. 
The round key is used only in the “AddRoundKey” step, which is why the cipher begins 
and ends with an “AddRoundKey” step. Any other step applied at the beginning or end, 
is reversible without knowledge of the key and so would add no security. 
As with most block ciphers, the decryption algorithm makes use of the expanded key in 
reverse order. However, the decryption algorithm is not identical to the encryption 
algorithm. This is a consequence of the particular structure of AES. (Stalling 2010) 
 
4.1.4. Blowfish 
Blowfish is a substitute for the DES and IDEA encryption algorithm. It is a symmetrical 
block cipher (secret or private key), use that a variable key length from 32 to 448 bits. 
(The U.S. government prohibits the encryption output software to use the key which 
key-length is more than 40, unless special-purpose software).  
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Blowfish algorithm is an alternative encryption method, proposed in 1993 by Bruce 
Schneier. After the birth of the 32-bit processor, the speed of blowfish algorithm in the 
encryption beyond the DES attracted the attention of the people. Blowfish is a not 
registered patent, it can be used free. 
There are some features of blowfish: 
• Blowfish is fast, can be executed in 18 clock cycle in a 32-bit processor. 
• Blowfish needs only 5 KB of memory to implement 
• Blowfish is considered secure due to the key’s adjustable length (32-448) 
• Encryption consist 16+1 phases, each phase consists of ⊕, + and S-box 
operation 
• Decryption is identical to encryption; keys are used in inverse order. (Penttonen 
2009: p35.) 
(Qian 2013)
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Figure 26 and 27 shows the round function (Feistel function) of Blowfish encryption. 
(http://www.embedded.com/design/configurable-systems/4024599/Encrypting-data-
with-the-Blowfish-algorithm) 
 
 
Figure 27. Blowfish Algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Blowfish Algorithm 
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4.1.5 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Although elliptic curves cryptography will not be tested within the scope of this work, 
basic concepts will be illustrated for future references and work. Unlike the previous 
encryption algorithms, Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) is an asymmetrical 
encryption algorithm.  
Proposed in 1985 by Victor Miller and Neal Koblitz independently, ECC is considered 
more efficient than other asymmetrical encryption algorithms such as RSA, for the same 
level of encryption strength, ECC requires a smaller key size than RSA, which yields to 
faster encryption, lower power consumption and lower processing power. 
Table 6 illustrates the keys sizes of ECC and RSA encryption algorithms, corresponding 
to similar encryption strength. 
Table 6. Comparing ECC keys with RSA keys (Qian 2013) 
ECC Key Length 
(bits) 
RSA Key Length 
(bits) 
Crack Time /MIPS 
(years) 
ECC/RSA key length 
rate 
106 512 104 5:1 
160 1024 1011 7:1 
210 2048 1020 10:1 
600 21000 1078 35:1 
 
This cryptographic strength and the relatively small size of the keys are the 
reasons why ECC systems are used in the smart card environment. Table 7 
shows different generation and verification time on different platforms. 
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Table 7. ECC algorithms on different Platforms (Rankl and Effing 2010) 
Implementation 
Generate a 160-
bit signature 
Verify a 160-
bit signature 
Smart card with 3.5-MHz clock and 8-bit processor 1 s 4s 
Smart card with 3.5-MHz clock and numeric coprocessor 150 ms 450 ms 
PC (Pentium III, 500 MHz) 10 ms 20 ms 
 
Elliptic curves are continuous planar curves that satisfy the equation y2 = x3 + ax + b in 
a finite three-dimensional space. No point on the curve is allowed to be a singularity, 
which for example means that 4a2 + 27b2 ≠ 0. The finite bodies GF(p), GF(2n) and 
GF(pn) are used in cryptography, where p is a prime number and n is a positive integer 
greater than 1. 
In order to describe the ECC algorithm, Weierstrass equation is commonly used. 
𝑦2 + 𝑎𝑥𝑦 + 𝑏𝑦 = 𝑥3 + 𝑐𝑥2 + 𝑑𝑥 + 𝑒   (1) 
a, b, c, d are real numbers and x, y take the values of real numbers, for simplicity, the 
equation is reduced to 
𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏     (2) 
To plot this equation, y is computed as 
𝑦 = √𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏     (3) 
For given values of and, the plot consists of positive and negative values of for each 
value of y. Thus, each curve is symmetric about y=0. This yields for any specific value 
of a and b, there is a set of points (E) which satisfy the equation number (X3), this set 
(E) also include a point called O, which is called the “zero point” or “point at infinity” 
which serves as the identity element of the group. 
There are several implementations which use ECC as a foundation such as Elgamal 
ECC and Deffie-Hellman which is described in the following steps 
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A large integer Q is chosen, Q must a prime or an integer in the form of 2m. The a and b 
parameters of the equation (X3) must be applied in order to generate a group of points 
Eq(a,b). In the next step a base point G= (x1 , y1) in Eq (a,b)is selected, whose order is 
larger than value n. A key exchange between user Person A and B is described as follow 
Person A Key Generation 
Select private 𝑛𝑎 where 𝑛𝑎 < 𝑛 
Calculate public Pa  𝑃𝑎 = 𝑛𝑎 × 𝐺 
Person B Key Generation 
Select private 𝑛𝑏 where 𝑛𝑏 < 𝑛 
Calculate public 𝑃𝑏  𝑃𝑏 = 𝑛𝑏 × 𝐺 
User A Calculate the secret key 
𝐾 = 𝑛𝑎 × 𝑃𝑏                (4) 
User B Calculate the secret key 
𝐾 = 𝑛𝑏 × 𝑃𝑎                (5) 
ECC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (Stallings 2011: 343). 
ECC Encryption and Decryption 
An Elliptic curve is chose over a certain Galois Field (e.g. GF(2m)), the preparation 
assignments are: 
• Select GF(p) 
• Select elliptic curve (e) 
• Select base point G(x,y) 
• Applied algorithm for transforming plaintext into the points of elliptic curve, 
called encryption process 
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• Generating the private and public keys between sender A and receiver B. Select 
one private key n, calculate the public key 𝑃 = 𝑛𝐺 = 𝑛(𝑥,𝑦). For A, the private 
key is na, and the public key is 𝑃𝑎 = 𝑛𝑎𝐺 = 𝑛𝑎(𝑥,𝑦). For B, the private key is B 
n and the public key is 𝑃𝑏 = 𝑛𝑏𝐺 = 𝑛𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦) 
Encryption: A sends encrypted message to B 
• Choose random number k  1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑝 − 1 
• Get the corresponding points (xm , ym) by encoding the plaintext; 
• Calculate the cipher text 𝐶𝑚 = {𝑘(𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑥𝑚,𝑦𝑚) + 𝑘𝑃𝑏}, and the cipher text here 
turns into two points on the elliptic curve. 
Decryption: B decrypts the received message from A: 
• Calculation 
o �(𝑥𝑚,𝑦𝑚) + 𝑘𝑃𝑚� − 𝑛𝑏(𝑘𝐺)           (6) 
o = �(𝑥𝑚,𝑦𝑚) + 𝑘�𝑛𝑏(𝑥,𝑦)�� − 𝑛𝑏�𝑘(𝑥, 𝑦)�         (7) 
o =  (𝑥𝑚,𝑦𝑚) + 𝑘𝑛𝑏(𝑥, 𝑦) − 𝑛𝑏𝑘(𝑥,𝑦)         (8) 
o = (𝑥𝑚,𝑦𝑚) 
• Get the corresponding plaintext by decoding the points (xm,ym). 
The study and implementation of elliptic curve cryptography is now becoming a focus 
in public-key cryptosystems. Its relies on the difficulty to solve the discrete logarithm of 
the elliptic curve Abelian group. 
They way RFID systems (tags, smart cards, NFC devices) utilize these encryption 
algorithms is by employing them in “Mutual Authentication” procedure. Mutual 
authentication means that both the reader and the target authenticate one another. The 
reader authenticates the target in order to protect the application from “manipulation” 
using falsified data. Likewise, the target must protect the data stored in it from 
skimming or overwriting by unauthorized readers. 
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Based on the application at which the RFID system is deployed, the mutual 
authentication can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical (symmetrical or asymmetrical 
encryption). Mutual symmetrical authentication is used in applications where the 
number or transponders (targets) are limited, and all the transponders and readers that 
form part of an application possess a single identical cryptographical key K, once the 
transponder is detected by the reader, the reader sends a (GET_CHALLANGE) 
command to the transponder. The transponder responds to the command, by generating 
a random number RA and sends it to the reader in a (response → Challenge-response) 
procedure. The reader now generates a random number RB. Using the common secret 
key K and a common key algorithm ek, the reader calculates an encrypted data block 
(token 1), which contains both random numbers and additional control data, and sends 
this data block to the transponder. 
𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 1 =  𝑒𝑘(|𝑅𝐵||𝑅𝐴||𝐼𝐷𝐴|𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡1)   (9) 
The transponder decrypts the received token, and checks if the random number 
contained in the plaintext 𝑅?́? correspond to the original random number 𝑅𝐴. If they are 
equal, the transponder confirms that the two common keys are the same (the 
transponder’s key and the reader’s key). 
Another random number RA2 is generated in the transponder and this is used to calculate 
an encrypted data block (token 2), which also contains RB and control data. Token 2 is 
sent from the transponder to the reader. 
𝑇𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛 2 =  𝑒𝑘(|𝑅𝐴2||𝑅𝐵|𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡2)    (10) 
The reader decrypts the received token (token 2) and checks if the received random 
number within the token 𝑅𝐵́  is equal to the random number generated at the reader RB. 
If the two figures correspond, then the reader is satisfied that the common key has been 
proven. Transponder and reader have thus ascertained that they belong to the same 
system and further communication between the two parties is thus is authenticated and 
valid. (Finkenzeller 2010) 
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The mutual authentication has several advantages: 
• The secret key is never transmitted, only the numbers encrypted using the secret 
key are exchanged. 
• The random numbers are always encrypted at the same time. To minimize the 
possibility of calculating the secret key from invers transformation using RA to 
obtain Token 1. 
• The authentication process is not limited to a specific encryption algorithm 
(mutual symmetrical authentication process must use symmetrical encryption 
algorithm). 
• The use of two different random numbers from two different sources ensures 
safety against “replay attacks”, eliminating the possibility of recording the 
authentication sequence. 
Mutual symmetrical authentication process is not suitable in applications where the 
number of transponders (targets) is vast, which will increase the probability of the secret 
key being discovered, because such transponders are accessible to an uncontrolled 
numbers. 
Authentication using a derived key can provide a significant improvement on mutual 
symmetrical authentication, by securing each transponder with a different cryptological 
key. To achieve this, the serial number of each transponder is read out during its 
production. A key KX is calculated (→ derived) using a cryptological algorithm and a 
master key KM, and the transponder is thus initialized. Each transponder thus receives a 
key linked to its own ID number and the master key KM. 
The mutual authentication begins by the reader requesting the ID number of the 
transponder. In a special security module in the reader - the Security Authentication 
Module (S.A.M) - the transponder’s specific key is calculated using the master key KM, 
so that this can be used to initiate the authentication procedure. The S.A.M normally 
takes the form of a smart card with contacts incorporating a cryptoprocessor, which 
means that the stored master key can never be read. (Finkenzeller 2010) 
 
 
60 
 
4.2. Experimental Procedures 
The aforementioned cryptographic algorithms will be tested in order to determine   
encryption and decryption times for different key lengths and different text sizes. As 
well as robustness against brute force attacks. Also the amount of power required for 
each operation. 
4.2.1. System Description 
The system consists of model B Raspberry Pi with Broadcom BCM2835 SoC, 700 MHz 
low power ARM1176JZE-F processor, and 512 MB SDRAM, running Raspbian 
operating system. SainSmart Mifare RC522 Card Read Antenna RF RFID Reader IC 
Card Proximity Module, 13.56MHz is connected to the system as the RFID reader.   
The other device is a computer with a 64-bit Intel Core i7-4700MQ CPU clocked at 2.4 
GHz, and 8 Gb of Ram, the operating system is 64-bit windows 8.1. the computer is 
used to mainly test the immunity of the encryption algorithms against brute force 
attacks, as well as to give context to the results obtained from the Raspberry Pi. 
The software implementation of the encryption algorithms is done using python script, a 
separate program is written for each different encryption algorithms. The source codes 
can be found in the appendix.  Figure 28 illustrates the general flowchart of the 
program. 
The chosen algorithms are Caesar, DES, 3DES, AES, and Blowfish. Caesar is chosen 
for the sole purpose of illustrating the basic concept of encryption and decryption. DES, 
3DES and AES are used currently in different applications where RFID systems are 
implemented, note that DES was used before it was replaced by 3DES and AES. And 
Blowfish is chosen for the flexible range of key sizes that can be used.  
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Figure 28. general flow chart of the used programs 
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Each algorithm will be run multiple times, with different key lengths and different text 
sizes. For each combination the test will be done five times, an average will be used to 
determine the final value. The same texts will be used and all tests are done under 
similar conditions. 
The testing experiments are divided into two phases; phase one which is done using the 
windows machine. The results obtained are used as a reference to the one obtained from 
the Raspberry Pi. These tests are designed to take time measurement only, using the 
timer function provided by the Python libraries. 
Phase two is redoing the same tests on the Raspberry Pi, the only difference is instead of 
entering the plain/cipher text manually, it will be read/written directly from/to the tags, 
the rest of the process is identical to the ones done on the windows machine. 
Phase one tests are 
1- Caesar 5 shifts    8-     AES 24 byte key length 
2- Caesar 10 shifts   9-     AES 32 byte key length 
3- Caesar 15 shits   10-   Blowfish 8 byte key length 
4- Des 8 bytes key length  11-   Blowfish 16 byte key length 
5- 3DES 16 bytes key length  12-   Blowfish 24 byte key length 
6- 3DES 24 byte Key length  13-   Blowfish 32 byte key length 
7- AES 16 byte key length 
These tests are done over two different text sizes (16 bytes and 1024 bytes) and they 
include encryption time, decryption time, and brute force attack. 
The text samples are 
16 bytes : hello world!! 
1024 bytes: The Snapdragon 810 replaces the 805 as the top of the line chipset. It 
features four Cortex-A57 and four Cortex-A53 processor cores. Those are the Cortex-
A15 and A7 replacements respectively, but the A57 should offer a 25-55% increase in 
performance at the cost of just 20% increase in power consumption. And the power 
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consumption will probably actually be even as the 20% difference will be offset by the 
use of a 20nm manufacturing process. 
The way the two new chipsets work is that the CPU cores are divided into two groups. 
All cores can work at the same time, but cores in a group must use the same frequency. 
This differs from the Krait designs where the clock speed of each core can be set 
individually. 
In terms of GPU, the Snapdragon 810 has a brand new Adreno 430, which is advertised 
as 30% faster than the Adreno 420, which in turn is 40% faster than the Adreno 330 
found in current Snapdragon 800/801 chipsets.The end result is something like an 80% 
performance increase over the current generation. filler 
(http://www.gsmarena.com/qualcomm_unveils_snapdragon_810_and_808_64bit_chips
ets-news-8241.php) 
The results will be divided according to their respective algorithms in the results 
chapter. 
Phase two is oriented towards the Raspberry Pi, since the Raspberry Pi platform share 
similar CPU architecture with modern mobile phones (ARM CPU Architecture), it can 
be used to represent a mobile device, the encryption and decryption tests will be 
conducted on the Raspberry Pi in order to obtain time measurements and power 
consumption measurements. 
The key space used in the encryption algorithms is limited to decimal numbers, also the 
all brute force attacks on all algorithms will succeed in deciphering the encrypted text 
after one billion attempts. The reasons for this design choice are to compare different 
algorithms with different key lengths equally, since a larger key length by one byte 
multiplies the key space by ten times. Also, to check if different key lengths for the 
same algorithm, has any effect on encryption and decryption times. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Phase one results 
Phase one results are results obtained from running the algorithms on the computer 
machine. 
5.1.1. Caesar 
The cipher texts for the 16 bytes plain text are 
5 shifts: mjqqt%|twqi&& 
10 shifts: rovvy*"y|vn++ 
15 shifts: wt{{~/'~"{s00 
Table 8 displays encryption, decryption and brute force attack results. While Figures 29, 
30, 31 show these times in relationship to each other’s.  
Table 8. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for different shift on 16 bytes text 
16 
Bytes 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 
5 2.3093E-5 1.3257E-5 3.5495E-5 1.2402E-5 1.2402E-5 1.9330E-5 1.0104E-5 
10 1.5396E-5 1.3685E-5 1.3685E-5 1.2402E-5 1.2402E-5 1.3514E-5 1.2321E-6 
15 1.3685E-5 3.1646E-5 1.3685E-5 1.5396E-5 2.3093E-5 1.9501E-5 7.8250E-6 
Decrypt 
5 3.0791E-5 2.7370E-5 4.2338E-5 1.2830E-5 1.2830E-5 2.5232E-5 1.2607E-5 
10 2.5659E-5 3.6778E-5 1.7534E-5 3.1646E-5 3.7206E-5 2.9765E-5 8.2848E-6 
15 4.0199E-5 1.3685E-5 1.3257E-5 1.3257E-5 1.4968E-5 1.9073E-5 1.1831E-5 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
5 6.7710E-3 9.3836E-3 1.0559E-2 1.1595E-2 1.4095E-2 1.0481E-2 2.7052E-3 
10 2.4662E-2 2.2888E-2 2.2311E-2 2.2778E-2 2.3723E-2 2.3272E-2 9.2901E-4 
15 2.2498E-2 2.2599E-2 2.2942E-2 2.3755E-2 2.2604E-2 2.2880E-2 5.1726E-4 
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Figure 29. Encryption time over 5 trials. 
 
Figure 30. Decryption time over 5 trials. 
 
Figure 31. Brute force attack time over 5 trials. 
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The cipher texts for the 1024 bytes plain text are 
5 shifts: 
Ymj%Xsfuiwflts%=65%wjuqfhjx%ymj%=5:%fx%ymj%ytu%tk%ymj%qnsj%hmnuxjy
3%Ny%kjfyzwjx%ktzw%Htwyj}2F:<%fsi%ktzw%Htwyj}2F:8%uwthjxxtw%htwjx3%
Ymtxj%fwj%ymj%Htwyj}2F6:%fsi%F<%wjuqfhjrjsyx%wjxujhyn{jq~1%gzy%ymj%
F:<%xmtzqi%tkkjw%f%7:2::*%nshwjfxj%ns%ujwktwrfshj%fy%ymj%htxy%tk%ozxy
%75*%nshwjfxj%ns%ut|jw%htsxzruynts3%Fsi%ymj%ut|jw%htsxzruynts%|nqq%uwtg
fgq~%fhyzfqq~%gj%j{js%fx%ymj%75*%inkkjwjshj%|nqq%gj%tkkxjy%g~%ymj%zx
j%tk%f%75sr%rfszkfhyzwnsl%uwthjxx3 
10 shifts: 
^ro*]xkzn|kqyx*B;:*|ozvkmo}*~ro*B:?*k}*~ro*~yz*yp*~ro*vsxo*mrsz}o~8*S~*pok
~ |o}*py |*My|~o#7K?A*kxn*py 
|*My|~o#7K?=*z|ymo}}y|*my|o}8*^ry}o*k|o*~ro*My|~o#7K;?*kxn*KA*|ozvkmowo
x~}*|o}zom~s!ov$6*l ~*~ro*K?A*}ry 
vn*yppo|*k*<?7??/*sxm|ok}o*sx*zo|py|wkxmo*k~*~ro*my}~*yp*t 
}~*<:/*sxm|ok}o*sx*zy"o|*myx} wz~syx8*Kxn*~ro*zy"o|*myx} 
wz~syx*"svv*z|ylklv$*km~ 
kvv$*lo*o!ox*k}*~ro*<:/*nsppo|oxmo*"svv*lo*ypp}o~*l$*~ro* }o*yp*k*<:xw*wkx 
pkm~ |sxq*z|ymo}}8 
15 shifts: 
cwt/b}p s"pv~}/G@?/"t {prt#/$wt/G?D/p#/$wt/$~ /~u/$wt/{x}t/rwx 
#t$=/X$/utp$%"t#/u~%"/R~"$t(<PDF/p}s/u~%"/R~"$t(<PDB/ 
"~rt##~"/r~"t#=/cw~#t/p"t/$wt/R~"$t(<P@D/p}s/PF/"t {prt|t}$#/"t# 
tr$x&t{);/q%$/$wt/PDF/#w~%{s/~uut"/p/AD<DD4/x}r"tp#t/x}/ 
t"u~"|p}rt/p$/$wt/r~#$/~u/y%#$/A?4/x}r"tp#t/x}/ ~'t"/r~}#%| $x~}=/P}s/$wt/ 
~'t"/r~}#%| $x~}/'x{{/ 
"~qpq{)/pr$%p{{)/qt/t&t}/p#/$wt/A?4/sxuut"t}rt/'x{{/qt/~uu#t$/q)/$wt/%#t/~u/p/A?}|/|
p}%upr$%"x}v/ "~rt##= 
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Table 9 displays encryption, decryption and brute force attack results. While Figures 32, 
33, 34 show these times in relationship to each other’s. 
Table 9. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for different shift on 1024 bytes text 
1024 
Bytes 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 
5 2.4676E-4 2.3564E-4 2.7284E-4 2.4462E-4 1.9244E-4 2.3846E-4 2.9216E-5 
10 2.2965E-4 2.1939E-4 2.6472E-4 3.0834E-4 1.9287E-4 2.4299E-4 4.4692E-5 
15 2.3264E-4 2.4034E-4 2.4248E-4 2.4633E-4 2.5103E-4 2.4256E-4 6.8784E-6 
Decrypt 
5 2.3222E-4 2.7199E-4 2.4889E-4 2.2837E-4 1.9073E-4 2.3444E-4 2.9878E-5 
10 2.5060E-4 2.7755E-4 1.9458E-4 2.7755E-4 1.9031E-4 2.3812E-4 4.3147E-5 
15 2.3222E-4 2.3778E-4 2.4291E-4 2.2751E-4 2.3179E-4 2.3444E-4 5.9749E-6 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
5 1.9052E-2 1.9383E-2 2.0368E-2 1.9394E-2 1.9366E-2 1.9513E-2 4.9916E-4 
10 3.2252E-2 3.0454E-2 2.8768E-2 2.9402E-2 2.9597E-2 3.0095E-2 1.3484E-3 
15 1.9719E-2 1.9395E-2 1.9985E-2 2.0172E-2 2.4259E-2 2.0706E-2 2.0078E-3 
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Figure 32. Encryption time over 5 trials. 
 
 
Figure 33. Decryption time over 5 trials. 
 
 
Figure 34. Brute force attack time over 5 trials. 
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Figures 35, 36, summarize the encryption and decryption times, while Figure 37 shows 
the brute force attack times 
 
Figure 35. Encryption and decryption average time for 5, 10 and 15 Caesar shifts, text size 16 bytes 
  
 
Figure 36. Encryption and decryption average time for 5, 10 and 15 Caesar shifts, text size 1024 bytes 
  
 
Figure 37. Brute Force Attack average times for 5, 10 and 15 Caesar shifts, text size 16 and 1024 bytes. 
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5.1.2. DES 
DES has a fixed Key length of 8 bytes. 
Used Key: 999999999 
The cipher text for the 16 bytes plain text is 
HNWuF7O23BJTtYvDiF2Jgg== 
Tables 10 and 11 displays encryption, decryption and brute force attack results. While 
Figures 38 and 39 show these times in relationship to each other’s. 
Table 10. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for DES on 16 bytes text 
16 
Bytes 
Text 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 8B 1.2274E-4 5.0035E-5 5.2601E-5 5.1318E-5 5.1318E-5 6.5602E-5 3.1952E-5 
Decrypt 8B 4.9608E-5 4.9180E-5 5.0891E-5 5.0035E-5 5.1318E-5 5.0206E-5 8.8680E-7 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
8B 1.0559E+3 
1.0190E+
3 
1.0347E+3 1.0182E+3 
1.0201E+
3 
1.0296E+3 
1.6206E+
1 
 
The cipher text for the 1024 bytes plain text is  
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Table 11. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for DES on 1024 bytes text. 
1024 
Bytes 
Text 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 8B 1.7106E-4 1.7491E-4 1.5652E-4 1.5652E-4 6.6286E-5 1.4506E-4 4.4819E-5 
Decrypt 8B 1.4968E-4 1.5823E-4 6.3293E-5 1.3300E-4 1.3172E-4 1.2718E-4 3.7438E-5 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
8B 
1.7489E+
3 
1.7025E+3 1.7036E+3 1.6935E+3 
1.7017E+
3 
1.7101E+
3 
2.2098E+
1 
 
 
Figure 38. Encryption and decryption trials for DES, text size 16 and 1024 bytes. 
 
 
Figure 39. Brute Force Attack average times for DES, text size 16 and 1024 bytes. 
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Figures 40, summarizes the encryption and decryption times, while Figure 41 shows the 
brute force attack times. 
 
Figure 40. Encryption and decryption average time for DES, text size 16 and 1024 bytes. 
  
 
Figure 41. Brute Force attack average time for DES, text size 16 and 1024 bytes. 
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4.1.3. 3DES 
Two keys were used 16 bytes (0000000099999999) and 24 bytes 
(000000000000000099999999) 
The cipher texts for the 16 bytes plain text is 
16 bytes key: 
Bhtbz0KjVIne2AxRxFMO3A== 
24 bytes key: 
HNWuF7O23BJTtYvDiF2Jgg== 
Tables 12 and 13 displays encryption, decryption and brute force attack results. While 
Figures 42 to 47 show these times in relationship to each other’s. 
Table 12. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for 3DES on 16 bytes text with different keys 
16 
Bytes 
Text 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 
16B 6.4148E-5 6.4148E-5 1.0135E-4 6.4576E-5 8.6386E-5 7.6122E-5 1.7045E-5 
24B 6.6286E-5 1.2872E-4 6.3720E-5 6.5431E-5 6.2437E-5 7.7320E-5 2.8774E-5 
Decrypt 
16B 6.1582E-5 1.3813E-4 1.3813E-4 6.4148E-5 6.2865E-5 9.2972E-5 4.1235E-5 
24B 6.3293E-5 1.1333E-4 8.5103E-5 6.5003E-5 6.1582E-5 7.7662E-5 2.2095E-5 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
16B 
1.7335E+
3 
1.7348E+3 1.7464E+3 
1.7313E+
3 
1.6750E+
3 
1.7242E+3 2.8131E+1 
24B 
1.7388E+
3 
1.7811E+3 1.7294E+3 
1.7420E+
3 
1.7333E+
3 
1.7449E+3 2.0802E+1 
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The cipher text for the 1024 bytes plain text is 
16 bytes key:  
24 bytes key:  
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Table 13. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for 3DES on 1024 bytes text with different keys 
1024 
Bytes 
Text 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 
16B 1.9715E-4 1.8261E-4 1.3086E-4 2.0356E-04 9.1090E-5 1.6105E-4 4.8427E-5 
24B 2.3778E-4 2.2024E-4 1.9159E-4 2.0827E-04 1.2915E-4 1.9740E-4 4.1718E-5 
Decrypt 
16B 1.7662E-4 1.9587E-4 1.9672E-4 9.0235E-05 1.9244E-4 1.7038E-4 4.5531E-5 
24B 1.7149E-4 1.7577E-4 1.1205E-4 9.2373E-05 9.1090E-5 1.2855E-4 4.2004E-5 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
16B 
3.5570E+
3 
3.4344E+
3 
3.3370E+
3 
3.4656E+0
3 
3.5697E+
3 
3.4727E+3 
9.5458E+
1 
24B 
3.4481E+
3 
3.5587E+
3 
3.4563E+
3 
3.3912E+0
3 
3.3853E+
3 
3.4479E+3 
6.9799E+
1 
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Figure 42. Encryption trials for 3DES, text size 16 with different key lengths. 
 
 
Figure 43. Decryption trials for 3DES, text size 16 with different key lengths. 
 
 
Figure 44. Brute Force attack trials for 3DES, text size 16 with different key lengths. 
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Figure 45. Encryption trials for 3DES, text size 1024 with different key lengths. 
  
 
Figure 46. Decryption trials for 3DES, text size 1024 with different key lengths. 
 
  
Figure 47. Brute Force attack trials for 3DES, text size 16 with different key lengths. 
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Figures 48, summarizes the encryption and decryption times, while Figure 49 shows the 
brute force attack times 
 
Figure 48. Encryption and decryption average time for 3DES, text size 16 and 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
  
 
Figure 49. Brute Force attack average time for 3DES, text size 16 and 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
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5.1.4. AES 
Three keys were used, 16 bytes (0000000099999999), 24 bytes 
(000000000000000099999999) and 32 bytes Key 
(00000000000000000000000099999999) 
The cipher texts for the 16 bytes plain text is 
16 bytes key: 
wDK4q4b/9obx2h3aiTd0yg== 
24 bytes key: 
SljuwU1LoTjXx2Imtsruqg== 
32 bytes key: 
cy6ikfCY3ITpKNT7s9mbdg== 
Tables 14 and 15 displays encryption, decryption and brute force attack results. While 
Figures 50 to 55 show these times in relationship to each other’s. 
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Table 14. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for AES on 16 bytes text with different keys 
16 
Bytes 
Text 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 
16B 3.6350E-5 9.4084E-5 9.3441E-6 9.3441E-6 3.5923E-5 3.7009E-5 3.4604E-5 
24B 3.7206E-5 1.0178E-4 3.5923E-5 3.5068E-5 3.6778E-5 4.9351E-5 2.9321E-5 
32B 3.6350E-5 7.4412E-5 7.4839E-5 3.9772E-5 3.6778E-5 5.2430E-5 2.0305E-5 
Decrypt 
16B 3.5923E-5 8.6386E-5 4.3193E-5 3.6778E-5 3.5068E-5 4.7469E-5 2.1990E-5 
24B 3.3785E-5 8.4248E-5 3.5495E-5 3.2929E-5 3.3785E-5 4.4048E-5 2.2491E-5 
32B 4.4904E-5 9.3228E-5 4.8752E-5 3.4640E-5 3.5923E-5 5.1489E-5 2.4079E-5 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
16B 7.1090E+2 
7.0100E+
2 
7.0048E+
2 
6.8354E+2 
6.9876E+
2 
6.9894E+
2 
9.8328E+
0 
24B 7.2169E+2 
7.0812E+
2 
7.1690E+
2 
7.6204E+2 
7.2928E+
2 
7.2761E+
2 
2.0724E+
1 
32B 7.0765E+2 
7.0546E+
2 
7.0697E+
2 
7.2328E+2 
7.0933E+
2 
7.1054E+
2 
7.2545E+
0 
 
The cipher text for the 1024 bytes plain text is 
16 bytes key:  
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24 bytes key:  
32 bytes key:  
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Table 15. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for AES on 1024 bytes text with different keys 
1024 
Bytes 
Text 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 
16B 3.7206E-5 9.9643E-5 3.5495E-5 3.6778E-5 3.6778E-5 4.9180E-5 2.8217E-5 
24B 1.1932E-4 4.7897E-5 4.5759E-5 1.2958E-4 4.3193E-5 7.7149E-5 4.3362E-5 
32B 1.3300E-4 1.2659E-4 1.3172E-4 1.3599E-4 4.5331E-5 1.1453E-4 3.8830E-5 
Decrypt 
16B 3.6778E-5 3.4212E-5 3.6350E-5 3.5923E-5 3.4640E-5 3.5581E-5 1.1070E-6 
24B 1.1461E-4 1.1974E-4 4.2338E-5 1.1974E-4 4.1910E-5 8.7669E-5 4.1630E-5 
32B 1.5182E-4 9.9215E-5 4.6187E-5 1.1932E-4 4.0627E-5 9.1432E-5 4.7730E-5 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
16B 1.1192E+3 
1.1025E+
3 
1.0945E+
3 
1.0795E+
3 
1.0860E+
3 
1.0963E+
3 
1.5426E+1 
24B 1.1774E+3 
1.1715E+
3 
1.1694E+
3 
1.1702E+
3 
1.1783E+
3 
1.1734E+
3 
4.1944E+0 
32B 1.1508E+3 
1.1621E+
3 
1.1508E+
3 
1.1453E+
3 
1.1524E+
3 
1.1523E+
3 
6.1072E+0 
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Figure 50. Encryption trials for AES, text size 16 bytes with different key lengths. 
  
 
Figure 51. Decryption trials for AES, text size 16 bytes with different key lengths. 
 
 
Figure 52. Brute Force attack trials for AES, text size 16 bytes with different key lengths. 
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Figure 53. Encryption trials for AES, text size 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
  
 
Figure 54. Decryption trials for AES, text size 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
  
 
Figure 55. Brute Force attack trials for AES, text size 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
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Figures 56, summarizes the encryption and decryption times, while Figure 57 shows the 
brute force attack times 
 
Figure 56. Encryption and decryption average time for AES, text size 16 and 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
  
 
Figure 57. Brute Force attack average time for AES, text size 16 and 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
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 5.1.5. Blowfish 
Four keys were used, 8 bytes (999999999), 16 bytes (0000000099999999), 24 bytes 
(000000000000000099999999) and 32 bytes Key 
(00000000000000000000000099999999) 
The cipher texts for the 16 bytes plain text is 
8 bytes key: 
wyRRejFc9Yy1z1IfDaRZJg== 
16 bytes key: 
DeYwqctCGMsQQIPGzR96Ww== 
24 bytes key: 
Pswz+4rotXkJkwgiFxe7oA== 
32 bytes key: 
zBt04o6V+444fWI7IB8UrQ== 
Tables 16 and 17 displays encryption, decryption and brute force attack results. While 
Figures 58 to 63 show these times in relationship to each other’s. 
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Table 16. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for AES on 16 bytes text with 
16 
Bytes 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 
8B 1.2659E-4 6.8852E-5 6.8424E-5 6.9280E-5 7.6978E-5 8.2024E-5 2.5160E-5 
16B 6.9707E-5 1.2872E-4 9.1945E-5 7.0135E-5 6.8852E-5 8.5873E-5 2.5845E-5 
24B 7.0990E-5 7.0135E-5 8.8524E-5 7.0563E-5 7.0990E-5 7.4241E-5 7.9926E-6 
32B 7.0135E-5 7.8260E-5 6.6714E-5 7.0990E-5 1.0349E-4 7.7918E-5 1.4902E-5 
Decrypt 
8B 6.8424E-5 1.3129E-4 6.7569E-5 6.9280E-5 6.5859E-5 8.0484E-5 2.8429E-5 
16B 6.5431E-5 1.1718E-4 6.7997E-5 6.7569E-5 6.8424E-5 7.7320E-5 2.2311E-5 
24B 1.0306E-4 1.6123E-4 6.7997E-5 6.6714E-5 6.6714E-5 9.3143E-5 4.1119E-5 
32B 6.9280E-5 6.6286E-5 1.2017E-4 9.0662E-5 6.8424E-5 8.2965E-5 2.3024E-5 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
8B 
4.2154E+
3 
4.0620E+
3 
4.0671E+
3 
4.0477E+
3 
4.2266E+
3 
4.1238E+
3 
8.9157E+1 
16B 
4.1933E+
3 
4.2197E+
3 
4.2157E+
3 
4.0569E+
3 
4.0494E+
3 
4.1470E+
3 
8.6298E+1 
24B 
4.0835E+
3 
4.2635E+
3 
4.2534E+
3 
4.2655E+
3 
4.2619E+
3 
4.2256E+
3 
7.9562E+1 
32B 
4.2441E+
3 
4.2535E+
3 
4.2335E+
3 
4.2665E+
3 
4.2759E+
3 
4.2547E+
3 
1.6978E+1 
 
The cipher texts for the 1024 bytes plain text is 
8 bytes key: 
33bhZbLL4sz+RtER2tmMV2Orw4i5zlCr20lLhw1qmk1YFxO4tcWpTuLr0T2QOEmq
ZZeLwOz7L5HNHMhjU4eQZ1UMH5+ypSqYBKDm8LWZ0xGhfOtNeoCqzLiH0wY
ePx7wsMI+c7lbayykYTpZ+AfhIiaQnvwwhTw+XKv7c2ktYvWOow6rREp55sK5Ysbk
6fu5HnzdU8nrkTLqC9IVqbc9qp0Ttjarq8hvXyuTM6NJi6YwAOAhs5KQiVhEXAvn4
EzFXk/xVo1kJhT8JF8iyLi1+QFUdTZK0rkL7MMAAON6qbEoXH9Qf7PVF6sW57h5
hki+BYCYGQ6261X3bqsa/qdthIeOt7lMDsPlkz/5Ebr1daEoXH9Qf7PVF/lYmuoyRky
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K2pRXVL2XdrioNufEJ92N+tvP5pbvzx32XRFEsqm+Mwfyv7o9g0FjJW5YTnG7CMI
LfoFuDAiin5lkhB9PfQNksJpMtAXGmZ5Cx5O11JM0thxbxb8WRRnuM+TlkA52895
01o0MFyOvN2ijhKVrXyjUTK041rfZw57Nn10wLBZNGxD90sZH86BMkb6Pp/swvr7
4h8+ORPPdz6eQ750Kbfp4TA== 
16 bytes key:  
24 bytes key:  
32 bytes key: 
3k8ZEI1TiFArEXX5aN9I5RvcGERSJ3KBcc51zDK08vF5yUNeRMXCSU2gPwybNSr
3rRStrj+Sb+I4amOlJfCZYDwZT9XiO0tTrDm+gn65/q/Fde5APp+TLMaYIfCflznUe1L
 
 
89 
 
3jSS6DpWcUILgyis43q1K39FJaMS8U8+SAdojD/wyDFIhBENMnh8Gfobexk/tsvKTa
Pv83YYyHTPhzuvjQtccsWkNja7S6jAtFi+W6hHHmmxTAW2H3QbiDLDdNfgMS1p
RrE6BO3bmRp6db9+BYj5DF1HC8NkZtAlLcYnAkmTX2Oa2nUX3IwcLpJ16bd8dU
UceJ0PlNrJIFoSfV9GJgS3Kj4/eAKS7xg3BRhHDig7X2Oa2nUX3I5Fx6HMwT/iQu8k
U8E2LXIYm9fv/7MjWl+ZWED8c+JKWiBpyXQuUm2QLVnvwD+nBLIHOSM36TIy
ACBO/h6sqM5sekAYi9i8x5ZBvOe/E5GqNqIkp0CxhFz3bojs1GG3OoIS6WOyBw18L
1uTj+8/pp5ClqI0ZctQzteIq4QJyY7++gqsifjY2s2YXT1k3dPmqytDBGCv37tBHSOng+
n5NsnKazG3/7hntlw== 
Table 17. Encryption, decryption and brute force time for AES on 1024 bytes text with 
1024 
Bytes 
Key 
Size 
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Avg StdDev 
Encrypt 
8B 1.5224E-4 1.5267E-4 1.4284E-4 1.5310E-4 1.3899E-4 1.4797E-4 6.5906E-6 
16B 1.6465E-4 1.4412E-4 1.4626E-4 1.4711E-4 1.3899E-4 1.4822E-4 9.7078E-6 
24B 1.7277E-4 1.3941E-4 9.8360E-5 1.6037E-4 7.8260E-5 1.2984E-4 4.0368E-5 
32B 1.4284E-4 1.3642E-4 7.7833E-5 1.4326E-4 8.2109E-5 1.1649E-4 3.3484E-5 
Decrypt 
8B 1.5567E-4 1.3770E-4 7.5267E-5 7.4412E-5 7.5267E-5 1.0366E-4 3.9785E-5 
16B 1.4626E-4 1.2830E-4 1.4540E-4 7.5267E-5 1.2231E-4 1.2351E-4 2.8933E-5 
24B 1.4711E-4 1.5053E-4 8.1682E-5 7.3556E-5 7.4412E-5 1.0546E-4 3.9730E-5 
32B 1.4497E-4 1.7405E-4 1.3257E-4 1.4925E-4 1.4540E-4 1.4925E-4 1.5219E-5 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
8B 
4.7120E+
3 
4.7290E+
3 
4.5738E+
3 
4.6334E+
3 
4.6419E+
3 
4.6580E+
3 
6.3054E+1 
16B 
4.7072E+
3 
4.6979E+
3 
4.7228E+
3 
4.6187E+
3 
4.6543E+
3 
4.6802E+
3 
4.2764E+1 
24B 
4.8397E+
3 
4.8007E+
3 
4.6669E+
3 
4.7148E+
3 
4.6264E+
3 
4.7297E+
3 
8.9419E+1 
32B 
4.8605E+
3 
4.8630E+
3 
4.7852E+
3 
4.6898E+
3 
4.6704E+
3 
4.7738E+
3 
9.1331E+1 
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Figure 58. Encryption trials for Blowfish, text size 16 bytes with different key lengths. 
  
 
Figure 59. Decryption trials for Blowfish, text size 16 bytes with different key lengths. 
 
 
Figure 60. Brute Force attack trials for Blowfish, text size 16 bytes with different key lengths. 
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Figure 61. Encryption trials for Blowfish, text size 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
 
 
Figure 62. Decryption trials for Blowfish, text size 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
 
 
Figure 63. Brute Force attack trials for Blowfish, text size 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
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Figures 64, summarizes the encryption and decryption times, while Figure 65 shows the 
brute force attack times 
 
Figure 64. Encryption and decryption average time for Blowfish, text size 16 and 1024 bytes with different key 
lengths. 
  
 
Figure 65. Brute Force attack average time for Blowfish, text size 16 and 1024 bytes with different key lengths. 
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Figure 65, 66, and 67 shows a general view for the average time of encryption, 
decryption and brute force attack times for all the algorithms with different key lengths 
for texts sizes 16 and 1024 respectively. 
 
Figure 66. Average encryption time for all algorithms 
  
 
Figure 67. Average decryption time for all algorithms 
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Figure 68. Average Brute force attack time for all algorithms 
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5.2. Phase Two Results 
Phase two results are obtained from running the algorithms on the Raspberry Pi 
Due to the similar architecture of the Raspberry Pi and modern mobile phones, the 
Raspberry Pi can be considered as an entry level smart phone. Hence, the brute force 
attack trials will not be conducted, encryption and decryption times and power 
consumption are more important in a mobile application. 
The power consumption reading was taken using a multi-meter connected in series to 
the general purpose input/output pins (GPIO pins). The readings were taken during the 
idle state (running the graphical user interface, and from the command line) and while 
running the algorithms, the difference between the two reading is the amount of currents 
drawn by the device to execute the algorithms. The idle state gave an average reading of 
355mA, and for all the algorithms the average current reading was 400mA, with 
maximum current value of 419mA, the CPU usage reached 100% when executing the 
algorithms, these readings was consistent for algorithms running in the terminal in the 
graphical user interface and in the command line environment. 
Time trials results of for encryption and decryption are displayed in Table 17. 
Table 18. Average encryption and decryption time of 16 byte text on a Raspberry Pi 
Algorithms Key Size Encryption Average (seconds) Decryption Average (seconds) 
Caesar 
5 shifts 0.0011 0.0012 
10 shifts 0.0013 0.0013 
15 shifts 0.001 0.0008 
DES 8 Bytes 0.00165 0.0017 
3DES 
16 Bytes 0.0016 0.0017 
24 Bytes 0.0018 0.00185 
AES 
16 Bytes 0.0015 0.0015 
24 Bytes 0.0015 0.00175 
32 Bytes 0.0015 0.0015 
Blowfish 
8 Bytes 0.0019 0.00185 
16 Bytes 0.0018 0.00165 
24 Bytes 0.00165 0.00185 
32 Bytes 0.0019 0.0018 
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These results were recorded using an oscilloscope, since the Raspberry Pi does not has a 
precise timer function. Figure 69 shows a snapshot of the oscilloscope recording the 
encryption time for the DES algorithm 
 
Figure 69. A snapshot form the oscilloscope showing the encryption time of DES on the Raspberry Pi. 
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5.3. Discussion 
The discussion will be separated into parts according to the encryption algorithms. 
There are several points to be mentioned regarding the testing process and the obtained 
results: 
• Phase one tests were conducted on a general purpose laptop computer, with 
preloaded operating system and different programs running in the background, it 
was not possible to obtain identical testing conditions. 
• The different programs running at the same time yields a more accurate results, 
since some of the NFC devices has an operating system running on them, with 
background processes running while the device is either encrypting or 
decrypting data. 
• The reduced key space is important for two reasons 
o It allows obtaining results with the given time 
o It simplified the brute force attack algorithm. 
• Due to time constrains, it was not possible to run the tests more than five times 
per algorithm, the average time for running the brute force attack on the 
windows computer was  271406.678170143 seconds which is equal roughly to 
75 hours of consecutive non interrupted running time. 
Caesar: Caesar encryption algorithms is significantly affected by the text size, for the 
small text, Caesar had the fastest in encryption and decryption times, however with the 
larger text size, it had the slowest encryption and decryption time. The brute force attack 
times were consistently the shortest of all the encryption algorithms, by a significant 
margin. 
DES: DES key is 8 bytes long, with parity bits at the end of each byte, this reduces the 
total possible key space, in the brute force attack test that was conducted. The used key 
for encryption was (99999999). However, the key that was used to successfully decrypt 
the cipher text was (88888888). This can be explained in Table 19. 
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Table 19. comparison between encryption key and brute force attack key. 
Cipher 
Key 
00001001 00001001 00001001 00001001 00001001 00001001 00001001 00001001 
Used 
Key 
0000100X 0000100X 0000100X 0000100X 0000100X 0000100X 0000100X 0000100X 
Brute 
Force 
Key 
00001000 00001000 00001000 00001000 00001000 00001000 00001000 00001000 
 
This property of DES significantly reduces the available key space from 264 to 256. And 
this not a specific case for the reduced key space, it is true for all possible key space 
used for DES algorithm. 
3DES: this algorithm is an improvement over the standard DES, as seen in the results, 
the brute force time is improved over the time needed to break DES given the same 
amount of trials. There is an increase in encryption and decryption times over standard 
DES. However, the increase in encryption and decryption times when compared to the 
increase in the needed time to brute force an encrypted text is smaller. The key used for 
the successful brute force attack was identical to the key used for encryption. 3DES 
consists of three DES phases, for encrypting, it encrypts with the first key, decrypts with 
the second key, and encrypts again with the third key. And the decryption process is the 
executed in a reverse order. For a key length of 16 bytes, the first and third key are the 
same, while in 24 bytes key length, each key is different, and that is why it is not 
possible to expand the key to more than 24 bytes. 
AES: except for Caesar, AES is the fastest algorithms for encryption and decryption 
even when using the longest key length possible, however this speed is also reflected on 
the brute force attack time. The AES encryption and decryption time is significantly 
affected by the plain text size, for the 16 bytes text, the encryption and decryption time 
differences were very small, these differences increased with the increase of the plain 
text size. The text size had no noticeable effect one the brute force attack time with 
different key sizes. 
Blowfish: encryption times for the different key lengths had almost an inverse relation, 
the smaller the key, the longer it takes to encrypt, this is true for both text sizes tested, 
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the relation between decryption times and key lengths are different, with smaller texts, 
the decryption times were close to each other, and with the larger text size, the largest 
key length had the largest decryption time. The inconsistent results can be explained by 
the status of the machine running the algorithms with different programs running in the 
background, the difference between the longest and shortest decryption times for the 
small text however is 15 micro seconds, and for the larger text the difference is 45 
micro seconds 
The encryption and decryption times obtained from the Raspberry Pi have a much 
smaller difference between different algorithms (maximum difference for encryption 
times was 0.0008 seconds and for decryption times 0.00105 seconds), compared to the 
average encryption and decryption times. 
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6. Conclusion 
Choosing the suitable encryption algorithm for any application is subject to several 
factors, the level of security needed, the amount of available memory, the available time 
for encryption and decryption and many others. 
Based on the conducted tests and obtained results, several conclusions can be made 
about all the test encryption algorithms. 
The Caesar encryption algorithm has the worst performance out of the tested 
algorithms, it had the longest encryption and decryption time, and the least immunity 
against the brute force attack, also it does not change the basic structure of the text, does 
not hide the frequency of the symbols in the text, and since it is based on substitution, it 
does not have a key. The Caesar algorithm is not suitable as a modern encryption 
algorithm, no matter what application it is used for. It does however provide a 
convenient way for cryptography and help familiarize some basic concepts for 
educational purposes. 
Based on the results DES is more secure against brute force attack than AES, given the 
same number of trials, which is DES major weakness, the limited key space makes 
calculating the key an easier task, which is helped by the reduction in the key space due 
to the exclusion of the parity bits. 
AES security is based on the significantly larger key space compared to DES. For the 
same key used for both algorithms (setting the rest of the AES bytes in the key to zero) 
AES encrypted text can deciphered faster than a text encrypted with DES, however, this 
can be mitigated using a longer key, for each byte, the brute force attack time needed to 
decipher an encrypted text is multiplied approximately by ten times. 
The short encryption and decryption time of the AES is another important advantage, 
from the current consumption readings, a shorter encryption and decryption time means 
less energy used, which helps in a device that runs on limited power supply such as a 
mobile phone powered by a battery. 
3DES is an improvement over standard DES, by expanding the key space. And just as 
in AES, the immunity against brute force attack can be improved by utilizing the rest of 
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the available bytes in the key. However, due to the smaller key space (24 bytes against 
32), AES can offer a better immunity. But comparing both algorithms using a similar 
key, based on the results, 3DES is more secure than AES. 
3DES is useful in applications where memory is a scars resource, and it is also suitable 
for systems that are based on DES, which can be upgraded to 3DES with minimum 
modifications. 
Blowfish performed very well in all three tests with all different key lengths, it had the 
largest brute force attack time even when the smallest key length was used. Encryption 
and decryption times were less than the ones obtained from 3DES, and the brute force 
attack times where similar for the same key when different text sizes were used. 
The flexibility Blowfish offer from the key length size is a very important advantage. 
Larger keys can be used according to the level of security needed, since based on the 
results, the immunity against brute force attacks is increased by increasing the key size, 
so increasing the key length and utilizing the all available bytes in the key can yield to a 
very robust and secure encryption, without compromising the encryption and decryption 
times. 
Based on the results obtained from the tests on the computer and on the Raspberry Pi, 
blowfish encryption algorithm is recommended for applications with high security 
requirements, and the flexible key lengths makes it suitable for applications with limited 
memory.  
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Future work 
The future work could involve observing the effect different encryption modes have on 
the encryption and decryption times, such as Cipher-block chaining, and Cipher 
feedback, as well as the effect they have on the immunity against brute force attacks. 
Different encryptions should also be considered such as elliptic curve cryptography, 
Twofish and Threefish, with larger key space if possible. 
Designing a dedicated system for testing the encryption algorithms with different 
programming language might also be considered, in order to minimize the background 
application interference. 
Different attacks can be considered beside the brute force attacks, focusing on one 
encryption algorithm at a time. 
Using an actual smartphone instead of the Raspberry Pi for testing different encryption 
algorithms, can yield a more accurate reading on the encryption and decryption times, 
as well as a precise reading for the power consumption. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Caesar Source Code. 
######################################## 
 ##                                                                     ## 
  ##  Caesar by Mohammed A. Mohammed  ## 
 ##                                                                    ## 
####################################### 
 
import time 
import timeit 
 
# this function is for deciding whether the user wants to encrypt or decrypt 
def getMode(): 
    while True: 
        print('Do you wish to Encrypt "e", Decrypt "d" or Brute force "b" a message?') 
        mode = input() 
        if mode in 'e d b'.split(): 
            return mode 
        else: 
            print('Enter either "e" for encrypt,"d" for decrypt, or "b" for brute force.') 
 
#this funiction is for the user to input the plain/ciphered text 
def text(): 
    print('Enter text:') 
    return input() 
 
#this funiction is for choosing the key 
def getKey(): 
    key = 0 
    while True: 
        print('Enter the key number') 
        key = int(input()) 
        key = key%95 # the key is set in module 95 so it will cover the range of all ASCII values 
without exceeding it 
        return key 
 
#this funiction is for the encryption/decryption 
def getTranslatedMessage(mode, text, key): 
    start = time.clock() 
    if mode[0] != 'b': 
        if mode[0] == 'd': 
            key = -key # since the encryption and decryption is Caesar are the exact opposite, the if 
statment only flips the sign of the key 
        translated = '' 
 
        for symbol in text: 
            num = ord(symbol) # getting the numerical value for the symbols (between 32-126) 
            mnum = num-32 # tranfaring the value of the symbol before shifting it to the range of 
(0-94) 
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            msnum = (mnum+key)%95 # shifting the modified value of the key within the allowed 
range (0-94) 
            snum = msnum+32 # returning the value to the ASCII range (32-126) 
            translated += chr(snum) # adding the new value to the new sring 
    end = time.clock() 
    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return translated 
 
mode = getMode() 
text = text() 
if mode[0] != "b": 
    key = getKey() 
    print('Your translated text is:') 
    print(getTranslatedMessage(mode, text, key)) 
else: 
    print("enter a part of the plain text") 
    text2 = input("") 
    for key in range (0, 95, 1): 
        start = time.clock() 
        translated = ("") 
        for symbol in text: 
            num = ord(symbol)  
            mnum = num-32  
            msnum = (mnum+key)%95  
            snum = msnum+32  
            translated += chr(snum)  
 
        if translated.find(text2) != -1: 
            print ("\nthe key is =",key) 
            print ("\nand the palin text is:\n") 
            print (translated) 
            end = time.clock() 
            print ("execution time is", end-start)  
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Appendix 2: DES Source Code. 
###################################### 
 ##                                         ## 
  ##  DES by Mohammed A. Mohammed  ## 
 ##                                                                 ## 
###################################### 
 
import time 
import timeit 
from Crypto.Cipher import DES #encryption is used for disguising data 
import os # os is for urandom, which is an accepted producer of randomness that is suitable for 
cryptology. 
import base64 
 
print ("key size is fixed at 8 Bytes including parities (56 bits effective)") 
size = 8 
 
key = '99999999' 
cipher = DES.new(key)             
BS = 8 
ciphertext = "" 
testtext = "" 
 
# deciding to encrypt, decrypt, or brute force a text. 
def getMode():  
    while True: 
        mode = input('Do you wish to Encrypt "e", Decrypt "d" or Brute force "b" a message?\n') 
        if mode in 'e d b'.split(): 
            return mode 
        else: 
            print('Enter either "e" for encrypt,"d" for decrypt, or "b" for brute force.\n') 
 
# encryption function 
def encrypt(text):  
    start = time.clock() 
    length = len(plaintext) 
    pad = lambda s: s + (BS - len(s) % BS) * ('~') 
    paddedtext = pad(plaintext) 
    encrypted = DES.new(key, DES.MODE_ECB) 
    ciphertext = base64.b64encode(encrypted.encrypt(paddedtext)).decode("utf-8") 
    end = time.clock() 
    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return ciphertext 
 
# decryption function 
def decrypt(text): 
    start = time.clock() 
    decrypted = DES.new(key, DES.MODE_ECB) 
    paddedtext = decrypted.decrypt(base64.b64decode(cipher)).decode("utf-8") 
    l = paddedtext.count ('~') 
    end = time.clock() 
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    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return paddedtext[:len(paddedtext)-l] 
 
#  brute force attack function 
# first part, generating the test keys 
def testkeys (): 
    start = time.clock() 
    for i in range (100000000): 
        temp = '{:08d}'.format (i) 
        if (brute(temp)) == 1: 
            end = time.clock() 
            print ("execution time is", end-start) 
            break 
 
# second part, checking the test keys to decrypt the cipher text 
def brute(testkey): 
        testkey = format (testkey) 
        decrypted = DES.new(testkey, DES.MODE_ECB) 
        paddedtext = decrypted.decrypt(base64.b64decode(cipher)).decode("latin-1") 
 
        if paddedtext.find(testtext) != -1: 
            print ("the key is ",testkey) 
            l = paddedtext.count ('~') 
            print (paddedtext[:len(paddedtext)-l]) 
            return 1 
        else: 
            return 0 
 
# the begining of the program 
mode = getMode() 
 
print ("key is:", key) 
 
if mode[0] == 'e': 
    plaintext = input("Enter the plaintext: ") 
    encrypted = encrypt(plaintext) 
    print ("encrypted:", encrypted) 
 
elif mode [0] == 'd': 
    cipher = input("Enter the ciphertext: ") 
    decrypted = decrypt(cipher) 
    print ("decrypted:\n", decrypted) 
 
else: 
    cipher = input("Enter the ciphertext: ") 
    testtext = input("enter a part of the plain text: ") 
    testkeys ()   
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Appendix 3: 3DES Source Code. 
######################################## 
 ##                                           ## 
  ##  3DES by Mohammed A. Mohammed  ## 
 ##                                                                  ## 
######################################## 
 
import time 
import timeit 
from Crypto.Cipher import DES3 #encryption is used for disguising data 
import os # os is for urandom, which is an accepted producer of randomness that is suitable for 
cryptology. 
import base64 
 
print ("choose key size") 
size = int(input()) 
while not (size in [16,24]): 
    print("wrong key size") 
    print ("choose a suitable key size") 
    size = int(input()) 
 
key = '0000000099999999' 
cipher = DES3.new(key)             
BS = 8 
ciphertext = "" 
testtext = "" 
 
# deciding to encrypt, decrypt, or brute force a text. 
def getMode():  
    while True: 
        mode = input('Do you wish to Encrypt "e", Decrypt "d" or Brute force "b" a message?\n') 
        if mode in 'e d b'.split(): 
            return mode 
        else: 
            print('Enter either "e" for encrypt,"d" for decrypt, or "b" for brute force.\n') 
 
# encryption function 
def encrypt(text):  
    start = time.clock() 
    length = len(plaintext) 
    pad = lambda s: s + (BS - len(s) % BS) * ('~') 
    paddedtext = pad(plaintext) 
    encrypted = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_ECB) 
    ciphertext = base64.b64encode(encrypted.encrypt(paddedtext)).decode("utf-8") 
    end = time.clock() 
    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return ciphertext 
 
# decryption function 
def decrypt(text): 
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    start = time.clock() 
    decrypted = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_ECB) 
    paddedtext = decrypted.decrypt(base64.b64decode(cipher)).decode("utf-8") 
    l = paddedtext.count ('~') 
    end = time.clock() 
    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return paddedtext[:len(paddedtext)-l] 
 
#  brute force attack function 
# first part, generating the test keys 
def testkeys (): 
    start = time.clock() 
    for i in range (10000000000000000): 
        temp = '{:016d}'.format (i) 
        if (brute(temp)) == 1: 
            end = time.clock() 
            print ("execution time is", end-start) 
            break 
 
# second part, checking the test keys to decrypt the cipher text 
def brute(testkey): 
        testkey = format (testkey) 
        decrypted = DES3.new(testkey, DES3.MODE_ECB) 
        paddedtext = decrypted.decrypt(base64.b64decode(cipher)).decode("latin-1") 
 
        if paddedtext.find(testtext) != -1: 
            print ("the key is ",testkey) 
            l = paddedtext.count ('~') 
            print (paddedtext[:len(paddedtext)-l]) 
            return 1 
        else: 
            return 0 
 
# the begining of the program 
mode = getMode() 
 
print ("key is:", key) 
 
if mode[0] == 'e': 
    plaintext = input("Enter the plaintext: ") 
    encrypted = encrypt(plaintext) 
    print ("encrypted:", encrypted) 
 
elif mode [0] == 'd': 
    cipher = input("Enter the ciphertext: ") 
    decrypted = decrypt(cipher) 
    print ("decrypted:\n", decrypted) 
 
else: 
    cipher = input("Enter the ciphertext: ") 
    testtext = input("enter a part of the plain text: ") 
    testkeys ()   
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Appendix 4: AES Source Code. 
###################################### 
 ##                                   ## 
  ##  AES by Mohammed A. Mohammed  ## 
 ##                                                                 ## 
###################################### 
 
import time 
import timeit 
from Crypto.Cipher import AES #encryption is used for disguising data 
import os # os is for urandom, which is an accepted producer of randomness that is suitable for 
cryptology. 
import base64 
 
print ("choose key size") 
size = int(input()) 
while not (size in [16,24,32]): 
    print("wrong key size") 
    print ("choose a suitable key size") 
    size = int(input()) 
 
key = '0000000099999999' 
cipher = AES.new(key)             
BS = 16 
ciphertext = "" 
testtext = "" 
 
# deciding to encrypt, decrypt, or brute force a text. 
def getMode():  
    while True: 
        mode = input('Do you wish to Encrypt "e", Decrypt "d" or Brute force "b" a message?\n') 
        if mode in 'e d b'.split(): 
            return mode 
        else: 
            print('Enter either "e" for encrypt,"d" for decrypt, or "b" for brute force.\n') 
 
# encryption function 
def encrypt(text):  
    start = time.clock() 
    length = len(plaintext) 
    pad = lambda s: s + (BS - len(s) % BS) * ('~') 
    paddedtext = pad(plaintext) 
    encrypted = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB) 
    ciphertext = base64.b64encode(encrypted.encrypt(paddedtext)).decode("utf-8") 
    end = time.clock() 
    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return ciphertext 
 
# decryption function 
def decrypt(text): 
    start = time.clock() 
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    decrypted = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_ECB) 
    paddedtext = decrypted.decrypt(base64.b64decode(cipher)).decode("utf-8") 
    l = paddedtext.count ('~') 
    end = time.clock() 
    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return paddedtext[:len(paddedtext)-l] 
 
#  brute force attack function 
# first part, generating the test keys 
def testkeys (): 
    start = time.clock() 
    for i in range (10000000000000000): 
        temp = '{:016d}'.format (i) 
        if (brute(temp)) == 1: 
            end = time.clock() 
            print ("execution time is", end-start) 
            break 
 
# second part, checking the test keys to decrypt the cipher text 
def brute(testkey): 
        testkey = format (testkey) 
        decrypted = AES.new(testkey, AES.MODE_ECB) 
        paddedtext = decrypted.decrypt(base64.b64decode(cipher)).decode("latin-1") 
 
        if paddedtext.find(testtext) != -1: 
            print ("the key is ",testkey) 
            l = paddedtext.count ('~') 
            print (paddedtext[:len(paddedtext)-l]) 
            return 1 
        else: 
            return 0 
 
# the begining of the program 
mode = getMode() 
 
print ("key is:", key) 
 
if mode[0] == 'e': 
    plaintext = input("Enter the plaintext: ") 
    encrypted = encrypt(plaintext) 
    print ("encrypted:", encrypted) 
 
elif mode [0] == 'd': 
    cipher = input("Enter the ciphertext: ") 
    decrypted = decrypt(cipher) 
    print ("decrypted:\n", decrypted) 
 
else: 
    cipher = input("Enter the ciphertext: ") 
    testtext = input("enter a part of the plain text: ") 
    testkeys ()   
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Appendix 5: Blowfish Source Code. 
########################################## 
 ##                                                ## 
  ##  Blowfish by Mohammed A. Mohammed  ## 
 ##                                                                        ## 
######################################### 
 
import time 
import timeit 
from Crypto.Cipher import  #encryption is used for disguising data 
import os # os is for urandom, which is an accepted producer of randomness that is suitable for 
cryptology. 
import base64 
 
print ("choose key size") 
size = int(input()) 
while not (size in range (4, 57)): 
    print("wrong key size") 
    print ("choose a suitable key size") 
    size = int(input()) 
 
key = '99999999' 
cipher = Blowfish.new(key)             
BS = 8 
ciphertext = "" 
testtext = "" 
 
# deciding to encrypt, decrypt, or brute force a text. 
def getMode():  
    while True: 
        mode = input('Do you wish to Encrypt "e", Decrypt "d" or Brute force "b" a message?\n') 
        if mode in 'e d b'.split(): 
            return mode 
        else: 
            print('Enter either "e" for encrypt,"d" for decrypt, or "b" for brute force.\n') 
 
# encryption function 
def encrypt(text):  
    start = time.clock() 
    length = len(plaintext) 
    pad = lambda s: s + (BS - len(s) % BS) * ('~') 
    paddedtext = pad(plaintext) 
    encrypted = Blowfish.new(key, Blowfish.MODE_ECB) 
    ciphertext = base64.b64encode(encrypted.encrypt(paddedtext)).decode("utf-8") 
    end = time.clock() 
    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return ciphertext 
 
# decryption function 
def decrypt(text): 
    start = time.clock() 
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    decrypted = Blowfish.new(key, Blowfish.MODE_ECB) 
    paddedtext = decrypted.decrypt(base64.b64decode(cipher)).decode("utf-8") 
    l = paddedtext.count ('~') 
    end = time.clock() 
    print ("execution time is", end-start) 
    return paddedtext[:len(paddedtext)-l] 
 
#  brute force attack function 
# first part, generating the test keys 
def testkeys (): 
    start = time.clock() 
    for i in range (10000000000000000): 
        temp = '{:08d}'.format (i) 
        if (brute(temp)) == 1: 
            end = time.clock() 
            print ("execution time is", end-start) 
            break 
 
# second part, checking the test keys to decrypt the cipher text 
def brute(testkey): 
        testkey = format (testkey) 
        decrypted = Blowfish.new(testkey, Blowfish.MODE_ECB) 
        paddedtext = decrypted.decrypt(base64.b64decode(cipher)).decode("latin-1") 
 
        if paddedtext.find(testtext) != -1: 
            print ("the key is ",testkey) 
            l = paddedtext.count ('~') 
            print (paddedtext[:len(paddedtext)-l]) 
            return 1 
        else: 
            return 0 
 
# the begining of the program 
mode = getMode() 
 
print ("key is:", key) 
 
if mode[0] == 'e': 
    plaintext = input("Enter the plaintext: ") 
    encrypted = encrypt(plaintext) 
    print ("encrypted:", encrypted) 
 
elif mode [0] == 'd': 
    cipher = input("Enter the ciphertext: ") 
    decrypted = decrypt(cipher) 
    print ("decrypted:\n", decrypted) 
 
else: 
    cipher = input("Enter the ciphertext: ") 
    testtext = input("enter a part of the plain text: ") 
    testkeys ()   
 
 
 
